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Fitting the Ethics to the Forum: A Proposal for
Process-Enabling  Ethical Codes
ROBERT C. BORDONE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty  years  ago, Professor  Frank E.A.  Sander  of Harvard  Law  School
envisioned  a  "multi-door  courthouse"  that  would  allow  parties  to  choose
among  a variety  of dispute  resolution  forums. 1 Arguing  that  the prevailing
"one-size-fits-all"  litigation-centric  approach  to  dispute  resolution  is  often
mismatched  with  the  actual  needs  of  many  disputants,  Sander  proposed
instead  that  lawyers  and  court  officials  first  help  parties  analyze  their
disputes, then  suggest appropriate forums  to assist in facilitating resolution. 2
For many  alternative  dispute  resolution  (ADR)  scholars,  this speech  marks
the advent of the modern  movement of alternative dispute resolution.3
* Thaddeus  R.  Beal  Lecturer  on  Law,  Harvard  Law  School  and  Deputy  Director,
Harvard  Negotiation  Research  Project,  Harvard  Law School.  A.B.,  Dartmouth College;
J.D.,  Harvard Law School.  I would  like to thank the editors of the Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Resolution  for their  invitation  to participate  in  their 2005  Annual  Symposium.
Special  thanks  also  to  Florrie  Darwin  of Harvard  Law  School  for her  feedback  and
editorial  assistance.  Thanks  also to my able research  assistant Jennifer Reynolds  for her
excellent work.
I Frank E.A. Sander,  Varieties of Dispute Processing,  70  F.R.D. 79,  111  (Apr. 7-9,
1976);  Frank  E.  A.  Sander  & Stephen  B.  Goldberg,  Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A
User-Friendly  Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure,  10 NEGOT.  J. 49  (1994).
2 Sander, supra note 1, at 112-13.
3 See  Carrie  Menkel-Meadow,  Roots  and Inspirations: A  Brief History of the
Foundations of Dispute Resolution, in THE  HANDBOOK  OF  DISPUTE  RESOLUTION  13-31
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005). See also Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is
Here: Preliminary  Reflections on  Where It  Fits in a System of Justice, 3  NEV. L.J.  289,
289 n.3  (2003)  (noting that  "Frank  Sander's  speech ...  introducing  the  concept of the
'multi-door  courthouse'  has  been  identified  by  many  as  a  key  event  in  the  birth  of
modem  ADR");  Lela  P.  Love  &  Kimberlee  K.  Kovach,  ADR:  An  Eclectic Array of
Processes, Rather Than  One Eclectic Process, 2000  J.  DtSP.  RESOL.  295,  298  n.11
(2000);  Carrie  Menkel-Meadow,  Mothers  and Fathers of Invention:  The Intellectual
Founders of ADR,  16  OHIO  ST.  J.  ON  DisP.  RESOL.  1,  1 (2000);  Barbara  McAdoo  &OHIO STATE  JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
As  a  consequence  of  the  increasing  use  of  various  and  highly
differentiated ADR processes, ADR scholars, ethicists, and practitioners  have
begun  examining the appropriateness  of lawyers'  ethical  rules  as embodied
in the Model Rules  of Professional Conduct (MRPC).4 Of particular  interest
for many of these writers has been how to square the Model Rules'  mandate
for zealous  advocacy with the imperative  for cooperation, collaboration,  and
joint problem-solving that is often required of processes  such as mediation  or
facilitated  consensus-building.5 The  fruit of this  work has  been the  creation
and adoption of new or supplementary  ethical  standards  for mediators  such
as  the  AAA-ABA-ACR  Model  Standards  of Conduct  for  Mediators,6  the
American  Academy  of Family Mediators  Ethics  Codes,7 and  the  Uniform
Nancy Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer's Philosophical  Map?, 18
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 376, 376 n.3 (1997).
4 See,  e.g.,  Joshua  Isaacs,  A  New  Way  to  Avoid  the  Courtroom: The  Ethical
Implications Surrounding  Collaborative  Law, 18  GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS  833 (2005); Scott
R.  Peppet,  Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the
Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90  IOWA  L. REv.  475
(2005); Christopher M. Fairman, Ethics and Collaborative  Lawyering: Why Put Old Hats
on  New Heads?, 18  OHIO  ST.  J.  ON  DisP.  RESOL.  505,  508-09  (2003);  Kimberlee  K.
Kovach, New  Wine Requires New  Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for Effective
Representation in  a  Non-Adversarial Approach  to  Problem Solving:  Mediation, 28
FORDHAM  URB.  L.J.  935  (2001);  Donald  R. Lundberg,  The Amended Indiana  Rules  of
Professional  Conduct:  Conflicts of Interest, RES  GESTAE,  Dec.  2004,  at  16;  James  M.
Bowie, Ethical Issues in Construction  Mediation:  Are There Any Rules?, CONSTRUCTION
LAWYER,  Spring  2004,  at  33;  Jonathan  R.  Cohen,  When  People are  the  Means:
Negotiating  with Respect, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739 (2001); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary
Conception of Lawyers'  Responsibilities, 38  S.  TEX.  L.  REv.  407  (1997);  Douglas  H.
Yam,  Lawyer Ethics in ADR  and the Recommendations of Ethics 2000 to Revise  the
Model  Rules  of  Professional  Conduct:  Considerations for  Adoption  and  State
Application, 54 ARK. L. REV.  207 (2001).
5 See,  e.g.,  Menkel-Meadow,  supra note  4,  at  427  ("[T]he  zealous  advocate  will
likely  prove  a  failure  in  mediation,  where  creativity,  focus  on  the  opposing  sides'
interests, and a broadening, not narrowing of issues, may be more valued skills.").
6 See  MODEL  STANDARDS  OF  CONDUCT  FOR  MEDIATORS  (2005),  available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfmal05.pdf
(last visited Oct.  17,  2005). The revised Model  Standards of Conduct for Mediators were
adopted  by  the  American  Bar Association's  House  of Delegates  at  their  August  2005
meeting  in Atlanta. It is the product of three years of work to revise the Model Standards
passed  in  1994.  The  revised  Standards  have  been approved  by  the Dispute  Resolution
Section  and the  Litigation  Section  after hundreds  of hours  of work  and  various  public
forums in New York, California, Florida, and Texas.
7 See Note,  Model Standards of Practice  for Family and Divorce Mediation, 39
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV.  121,  127-34 (2001).
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Mediation  Act  (UMA). 8  Likewise,  in  arbitration,  arbitrators  subscribe  to
ethics  rules  promulgated  by third-party  credentialing  organizations  such  as
the American Arbitration Association or the National Arbitration Forum.9
Though  separate ethics  rules exist for lawyers who  mediate or arbitrate,
there  continues  to  be  no  separate  ethical  rules  for  lawyers  engaged  in the
process of negotiation.' 0  Instead, lawyers  who negotiate  simply subscribe to
the MRPC, a set of rules designed with the litigation process in mind.
In  this  article,  I argue  that  ethical  rules  should  be  determined  by  the
particular process in  which  the  lawyers  are  engaged  and  that  these  rules
should be mandatory, not elective,  for the particular process.  In making this
case,  I will  focus  my  analysis  primarily  on  the  role  of the  lawyer  in  the
negotiation  process.  I  distinguish  my  proposal  from  both  those  which
advocate  specific ethics rules based on context or type of practice1'  and those
which permit or encourage  a more  free-market,  contracts-based  approach to
legal  ethics, 12  including  models  of  collaborative  law,  a  specific  type  of
contracts-based approach to negotiation.
8 UNIFORM  MEDIATION  ACT  (amended  2003),  available  at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bl/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm  (last visited Oct. 17,  2005).
9 See  THE  CODE  OF  ETHICS  FOR  ARBITRATORS  IN  COMMERCIAL  DISPUTES  (2003),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21958  (last visited Oct.  17,  2005); NATIONAL
ARBITRATION  FORUM,  NAF  CODE  OF  CONDUCT  FOR  ARBITRATORS,  available  at
http://www.arb-forum.com/arbitrators/code-arbitrators.asp  (last visited Oct. 17,  2005).
1 0 But  see  ETHICAL  GUIDELINES  FOR  SETTLEMENT  NEGOTIATIONS  §  1  (2002),
available  at  http://www.abanet.org/litigation/ethics/settlementnegotiations.pdf  (last
visited  Oct.  17,  2005).  The ABA Section on Litigation  created these guidelines to assist
attorneys  involved  in  settlement  negotiations.  Unlike  the  MRPC,  these  guidelines  are
entirely  advisory  and  are not  binding on practicing  lawyers.  For practice  notes  on this
matter,  see  Steve  Morris,  Christina  C.  Stipp  &  Elizabeth  Sorokac-Barnett,  Rules  of
Professional  Conduct, Ethical Conflicts Facing  Litigators, and Guidelines  for Settlement
Negotiations, SJ035 ALI-ABA  1575 (2004).
11  Fred  C.  Zacharias  has  written  extensively  on  this  topic.  For  an  overview,  see
Structuring  the Ethics of Prosecutorial  Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors  Do Justice?, 44
VAND. L. REV.  45  (1991);  Reform or Professional  Responsibility As  Usual  Whither the
Institutions of Regulation and Discipline?, 2003  U.  ILL.  L.  REV.  1505  (2003);  Five
Lessons for Practicing  Law in the Interests of  Justice,  70 FORDHAM L. REV.  1939 (2002).
12 See Peppet, supra note 4; see also Scott R. Peppet,  Contractarian  Economics and
Mediation Ethics:  The  Case for  Customizing  Neutrality  Through  Contingent Fee
Mediation, 82  TEx. L.  REV.  227,  275-85  (2003);  Charles  Silver  & Kent  Syverud,  The
Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers,  45  DUKE  L.J.  255,  306
(1995)  ("A  lawyer  is  first and  foremost  an agent.  A principal  can  generally structure  a
relationship  with  an  agent  along  any  lines  the  principal  chooses,  with  the  agent's
consent.");  Roy R.  Anderson  &  Walter  W. Steele,  Jr.,  Ethics and the Law of Contract
Juxtaposed: A  Jaundiced View of the Professional Responsibility Considerations  in the
Attorney-Client Relationship, 4  GEO. J.  LEGAL ETHICS  791  (1991);  Paula  A. Monopoli,OHIO STATE  JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
To make my argument,  I first provide an  overview  of the emergence  of
"process  pluralism"  in the  legal  system  over  the  past  thirty  years.  I then
articulate  a  theory  of professional  ethical  codes,  namely,  that  they  exist
primarily  to  enable  the  professional  to  better  achieve  her  purposes  in  a
particular activity,  not to impede  or limit  or constrain her ability  to behave.
The idea  of ethics codes  as  an enabling rather  than  a constraining  force  in
professional  life  is  largely  lost  in  today's  lowest  common  denominator
approach to legal ethics. Indeed, the various sets of ethical rules that exist for
litigation,  mediation,  and arbitration  are fundamentally  designed  to improve
the way in which these various functions operate.
My focus then  turns specifically  to the ethics  of negotiation.  Unlike the
other dispute resolution  processes  in which  lawyers  engage,  each  having  its
own particular ethical rules, negotiation  continues to piggyback on the ethical
guidelines used for litigation, namely, the MRPC. 13 Applying the model I lay
out  for  designing  ethics  codes  earlier  in  the  piece,  I make  the  case  that
negotiation-like  mediation,  arbitration, and litigation-should have  its own
set of ethical guidelines, designed to further the particular set of purposes and
goals that negotiation is best suited to achieve.  In so doing, I reject arguments
that  would  allow  for  the  exercise  of individual  autonomy  by  lawyers  or
clients with respect to different approaches  to and  different ethical guidelines
for negotiation. 14  Instead,  I contend  that  ethical  guidelines  for  negotiation
should  be  mandatory,  just  as  they  are  for  litigation,  mediation,  and
arbitration.  The article  maintains  that ethical rules  for negotiators  must  help
create  the  conditions  between  the parties  that  are most  likely  to facilitate a
good outcome  in  negotiation  (as  opposed  to  a  good outcome  in  mediation,
litigation,  or  some  other  dispute  resolution  process).  The  article  also
recommends some of the basic principles that should guide the drafters of the
new model rules for negotiation.
The  article  concludes  by  anticipating  some  of  the  philosophical  or
intellectual  objections to my suggestions for a new approach to legal ethics. I
address these concerns  and attempt to offer responses  to them. In addition, I
also  acknowledge  some  of the  more  practical  barriers  that  would  likely
impede  implementation  of  my  reforms  and  offer  some  suggestions  for
managing them.
Drafting  Attorneys as Fiduciaries:  Fashioning  an Optimal Ethical Rule for Conflicts of
Interest,  66 U. PITT. L. REV. 411,  446 (2005) ("Fashioning an optimal ethical  norm in the
context  of drafting[,]  attorneys  as  fiduciaries  must  be  informed  by efficiency,  fairness,
and the complex nature of the attorney-client relationship.").
13  MODEL RULES  OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 4.1 (a)-(b), R.  1.6,  and R. 4.1  cmt. 2 (2003).
14 See, e.g., Peppet, supra  note 4, at 510-11  (defending  the "moral pluralism" of the
legal profession  and  arguing that lawyers  and their clients should  have the autonomy to
choose more traditional  hard-bargaining and bluffing tactics  in negotiation).
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While this piece is not the first to propose a modification  of ethical rules
for  negotiators,15  it  is  the  first  to  suggest  that the  change  should  be  both
sweeping (i.e.,  not just a re-wording of Model Rule 4.1)  and mandatory. It is
also the first to argue that the perspective  from which we  should fashion our
ethical  rules  should  be  the  functional  purpose  of the  process  by  which
lawyers seek to achieve  their goal. I contend that tailoring ethics to a specific
legal specialization or around  subjective claims of moral or cosmic "right"  or
"wrong"  will  lead  to  confusion  and  frustration.  I  also  reject  more  recent
arguments  that would encourage  or permit  lawyers  to contract  privately  for
their own ethical rules.16
II.  LAWYERING  IN AN AGE OF PROCESS  PLURALISM
In their  1994 piece,  Fitting the Forum to the Fuss, Frank  E.A.  Sander
and Stephen  Goldberg  posited that  because  each  dispute resolution  process
has  features  that  foster  a  somewhat  different  set  of objectives,  thoughtful
lawyers and dispute resolvers  should first diagnose  the features of a dispute
before prescribing the appropriate dispute resolution process.17 Far too many
attorneys  plunge  headlong  into  litigation  whenever  a client  comes  to them
with  a problem.  Some  lawyers  do  this because  they  are  either  unaware  of
other process  choices  or  lack  the training  and  skills to avail  themselves  of
them.18 A  smaller  number  do it  because  the  legal profession  has  morphed
largely into a business  and the pressure to generate  large fees  forces lawyers
to recommend the most costly procedure for their clients, regardless of what
might  be  appropriate. 19  Whatever  the  reasons,  a  lawyer's  tendency  to
automatically pursue litigation  as the solution to a client's problems is akin to
a  cardiologist's  performing  bypass  surgery  on  every  patient  who  walks
through  the  door.  No matter  how  successful  heart  surgeons  may  be  in  the
operating  room,  they  are  more  dangerous  than  helpful  if they  perform  a
15 See generally Yam, supra note 4, at 207; Brian C.  Haussmann,  The ABA  Ethical
Guidelines  for Settlement Negotiations:  Exceeding the Limits of  the Adversarial  Ethic, 89
CORNELL  L. REV.  1218 (2004).
16 See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 665, 674
(2001)  (explicating and defending a contractarian approach  to legal ethics).
17 Sander,  supra  note  1,  at  127  (predicating  different  approaches  to  dispute
resolution upon the relationship  of the parties  involved).
18 See generally Robert  C. Bordone, Michael  L. Moffitt & Frank  E.A. Sander,  The
Next Thirty Years: Directions and Challenges in Dispute Resolution, in THE HANDBOOK
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 3,  at 507-22.
19 Cf  Jeffrey  W.  Stempel,  Reflections  on  Judicial ADR  and the  Multidoor
Courthouse at Twenty: Fait  Accompli, Failed  Overture, or Fledgling  Adulthood, 11  OHIO
ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 297,  382 (1996).OHIO STATE JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
triple-bypass  on  every  patient  regardless  of  the  patient's  symptoms  or
condition.  For  physicians,  the  ability  to  diagnosis  an  ailment  before
prescribing  an  appropriate  remedy  is  critically  important.  Amazingly,
however, most  lawyers  fail  to diagnose  the  ailments  of their clients  before
recommending  litigation.  By  reflexively  recommending  litigation  to  every
client,  lawyers  are  essentially  recommending  the  legal  equivalent  of open-
heart surgery to every patient.
Since  1976,  the number and variety of dispute resolution processes  used
by lawyers  has expanded  dramatically.20  Litigation  represents just one point
on  a  broad  continuum  of  dispute  resolution  processes  ranging  from
negotiation  to mediation, arbitration,  and a menu of hybrid processes  such as
med-arb, early neutral evaluation, and the mini-trial. 21
At  the  most  general  level,  the  primary  objective  of  each  dispute
resolution  process  is to resolve  disputes  between  individuals, organizations,
or groups.  However,  a look below this  obvious generic purpose reveals  that
each of these processes offers parties an approach to dispute resolution that is
informed by different values and accomplishes different purposes.22
In  addition,  how  one  defines  a  good  outcome  varies  enormously
depending  on  the  process  used  to  resolve  the  dispute. 23  Highly  skilled
mediators would be unlikely to claim that a dispute they mediated had a good
outcome  simply  because  the  dispute  was  resolved  quickly  or went  away.
Instead,  their assessment  of a  good  outcome  in mediation  would  take  into
consideration whether the mediators had upheld principles such as neutrality,
20 See, e.g.,  Center for Public Resources,  The ABC's of  ADR: A  Dispute Resolution
Glossary, 13 ALTERNATIVES  TO HIGH COST  LITIG.  147 (1995)  (listing and defining more
than  twenty  public,  private,  and  court-annexed  ADR  processes);  see  also  STEPHEN
GOLDBERG,  FRANK  SANDER,  NANCY  ROGERS  &  SARAH  COLE,  DISPUTE  RESOLUTION:
NEGOTIATION,  MEDIATION,  AND  OTHER  PROCESSES  4-6  (4th  ed.  2003);  Deborah  R.
Hensler,  Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement  Is
Reshaping Our  Legal System,  108 PENN  ST. L. REv. 165 (2003).
21 See GOLDBERG,  SANDER,  ROGERS  & COLE, supra note  20. See generally chapters
in  Understanding Dispute  Resolution  Processes,  in  THE  HANDBOOK  OF  DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, supra note 3,  at 277-406.
22 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow,  The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New
Practice,  70 TENN. L. REV. 63, 97  (2002) (referencing  Lon  Fuller's claim  that each kind
of dispute  resolution process-mediation,  arbitration,  consensus-building,  etc.-has  its
own "morality" and individual functional  analysis).
23 See  Carrie  Menkel-Meadow,  From Legal Disputes to  Conflict Resolution and
Human Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary  Context, 54 J.
LEGAL  EDUC.  7,  10  (2004);  see also Lisa  B.  Bingham,  Control Over Dispute-System
Design and Mandatory Commercial  Arbitration, L. & CONTEMP.  PROBS.,  Spring 2004, at
221  (arguing that courts should  oversee development of dispute resolution  design process
in commercial arbitration to ensure fair outcomes  for both parties).
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informed  consent,  self-determination  of  the  parties,  voluntariness,  and
confidentiality, 24  since  mediation  is  a  process  that  values  outcome
determination  by the parties and party autonomy. 25 Arbitrators,  on the other
hand,  would  measure  success  by  criteria  such  as  whether  the  parties
ultimately comply with the arbitrators'  decision,  whether the decision saved
the parties  time  and money,  and whether  the parties perceived  the decision
and the  process  as fair.26 A  good  outcome  in  litigation  might be defined  by
measuring  whether  justice  was  achieved,  a  right  was  vindicated,  or
appropriate  reparations  were  made.  Adjudication  also  provides  third-party
and  assumedly  more  neutral  decisionmaking  that  has  the  immediate
legitimacy  and credibility of enforcement  by the  state. From the perspective
of parties  embroiled  in  litigation,  whether  the  resolution  of  a  matter  is
"successful"  can  often  be  boiled  down  to  a binary  question  of whether  a
particular litigant won or lost.27
With the emergence  of process  pluralism in dispute resolution during the
past thirty years,  nearly every  law  school  has recognized  the  importance  of
offering  courses  on mediation,  negotiation,  arbitration  and other  alternative
dispute  resolution  (ADR) processes.28 But  more  and  more  law schools  are
24 See CARRIE  MENKEL-MEADOW,  LELA P.  LOVE, ANDREA K. SCHNEIDER & JEAN R.
STERNLIGHT,  DISPUTE  RESOLUTION:  BEYOND  THE  ADVERSARIAL  MODEL  325  (2005)
(arguing  that  "mediation  is  successful  if it  accomplishes  any  of the  following  goals:
giving  disputing parties  an enhanced  understanding  of their dispute  and of each other's
perspective, enabling parties  to develop options responsive to issues raised by the dispute,
and  bringing  closure  to  the  dispute  on  terms  that  are  mutually  agreeable").  For  an
example  of a more  formal  mediation  assessment tool,  see Nancy L.  Hollett, Margaret  S.
Herrman,  Dawn  Goettler Eaker  & Jerry  Gale,  The  Assessment of Mediation Outcome:
The  Development and  Validation of an Evaluative Technique, 23  JUST.  SYS.  J.  345
(2002).
25 See MODEL  STANDARDS  OF  CONDUCT  FOR  MEDIATORS,  supra note 6;  see also
Michael H. Diamant, Elizabeth  M. Zoller  & Philip R. Bautista, Strategies  for Mediation,
Arbitration and Other Forms of Dispute Resolution,  SK074  ALI-ABA  205  (2005);
GOLDBERG,  SANDER, ROGERS & COLE, supra note 20.
26 See  Alan  Scott  Rau,  The  Culture of American Arbitration and the  Lessons of
ADR, 40 TEx. INT'L L.J. 449 (2005);  see also Douglas Yam,  Foreword.:  An Introduction
to  Ethics in  a  World of Mandatory Arbitration, 18  GA.  ST.  U.  L.  REv.  903  (2002);
Diamant, Zoller & Bautista, supra  note 24.
27 See generally Jeffrey R. Seul, Litigation as a Dispute Resolution Alternative, in
THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 3, at 336-57.
28 See 2003  ABA  DIRECTORY  OF LAW  SCHOOL  DISPUTE RESOLUTION  COURSES AND
PROGRAMS,  available at http://www.law.uoregon.edu/aba/about.php  (last visited Oct.  17,
2005);  see also Robert  B.  Moberly, ADR  in the Law School Curriculum: Opportunities
and Challenges, available  at http://www.conflict-resolution.net/articles/moberly.cfm  (last
visited  Oct.  17,  2005);  Kay Elkins-Elliot  & Frank  Elliot, Settlement Advocacy,  11  TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 7 (2004).OHIO STATE  JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
also  realizing  that  teaching  law  students  how  to  mediate  or  arbitrate  or
litigate  is  not  enough.  Schools  also  need  to  teach  their  students  how  to
diagnose  the  quality  and  nature  of their  clients'  disputes  in  order  to  train
them to prescribe the appropriate dispute resolution process. In short, lawyers
are increasingly aware that they need to be equipped with tools of diagnosis,
not just  tools to perform  surgery.29 Demonstrating  that not all  disputes  are
alike  and  that  litigation  is  not  the  only,  the  best,  or  even,  at  times,  an
appropriate,  process for the management of many  disputes, has  been one  of
the most important  contributions of the modem ADR movement  to the  legal
profession.30  Indeed,  the  idea  that  a  dispute  resolution  forum  or  process
should be tailored to meet the particular needs of the parties in the context of
any given dispute has spawned a proliferation of processes and hybrids, from
consensus  building 31  to  various  forms  of mediation  including  facilitative,
evaluative,  and transformative.
32
III. THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL  ETHICS
Professions  articulate  and  adopt codes  of ethics  for many reasons.33 At
the most basic  level, ethical rules govern, direct, and limit the conduct of the
29 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Separate  and Not Equal: Integrating  Civil Procedure
and ADR in Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE  DAME L. REv. 681,701  (2005) (stating that  law
students  must be  taught  how  to decide  whether  a particular dispute  should be resolved
through  the  filing  of a  lawsuit  or  through  some  other  dispute  resolution  process  and
making the case for a much more integrated model of legal education).
30 "Any discussion of recent developments  in civil litigation must address  the virtual
revolution  that  has  taken  place  regarding  alternative  dispute  resolution  (ADR)."
Developments  in  the Law,  The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113  HARv. L. REv.  1752,  1851
(2000).  "Attorneys  have  witnessed  a steady growth  in their clients'  recourse  to ADR  in
place  of  lawsuits,  and  ADR  is  increasingly  incorporated  into  the  litigation  process
itself-in  the  form  of court-annexed  arbitration,  mediation,  summary jury  trials,  early
neutral  evaluation,  and  judicial  settlement  conferences."  Id. "'Alternative'  models  of
dispute resolution  have inarguably penetrated  the mainstream; the relevant  question now
is how they will change  it." Id. See also supra note 3.
31  See  Robert  M.  Ackerman,  Disputing Together:  Conflict Resolution and  the
Search for Community, 18  OHIO  ST. J. ON  DISP.  RESOL.  27,  30  (2002);  Wang Wenying,
The Role of Conciliation  in Resolving Disputes: A P.R.  C. Perspective, 20  OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 421  (2005); Menkel-Meadow,  supra  note 22,  at 95.
32 Menkel-Meadow,  supra  note 23, at 24.
33 See, e.g., Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle's Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer: Part  One
of a Study on Legal Ethics and Clinical Legal Education, 20  J.  LEGAL  PROF.  5,  27-8
(1996)  (providing a historical look at the development of ethics in the legal profession).
(Vol. 21:1 20051FITTING THE ETHICS TO THE FORUM
members  of a profession. 34  Ethics  can also be  used  to control  competition,
provide  guidance  to members of a profession, or help individuals distinguish
right  from wrong.35  In  the  legal  profession,  the  MRPC  have  come  to  be
understood as setting the basic limits of appropriate behavior-a minimum or
floor to which all members of the profession must adhere for membership  in
good standing within the profession.36
Understanding  ethics  and  ethical  guidelines  as  limiting  the  set  of
appropriate  or  acceptable  behaviors of a profession  is  certainly  a workable
way  to give  meaning  to what  it  means to  be  an  "ethical  lawyer."  In  some
sense,  the very nature  of ethical rules is to set  limits or constraints on what
those bound to the rules may  or may not do.37 At the same time, thinking  of
ethics  simply  as  demarcating  the outer  limits  of acceptable  behavior  for a
profession  ends  up  being  an  essentially  pessimistic  and  unhelpful  way  to
envision  the role  that ethical rules  can and  ought to play  in the professional
life of attorneys in the 2 1st Century.
Instead  of defining  ethics  in  ways  that  simply  constrain  behavior,  we
might imagine  that ethical codes  ought to  be conceived and crafted to  serve
as facilitators  of particular  kinds of behaviors,  attitudes, and  conditions that
ennoble  the professional  activities  and goals  of a profession's  members.  In
this  more  constructively  framed  understanding  of ethics,  we  analyze  the
appropriateness  of a particular  set of ethical norms  not by highly subjective
notions of what any one person  or group might think of as right or wrong or
morally good or bad. Nor do we develop ethical codes based on aspirational,
high-minded notions of "zealous advocacy"  that may sound noble but in fact
provide  little practical guidance to the attorney engaged  in a host of dispute
resolution  processes,  only  some  portion of which  could even  be  considered
true "advocacy"  in the traditional sense of the term.
Instead, the  approach to designing  a code of ethics that I champion  here
is  grounded  in  a much  more  functional  analysis.  Ethical  rules  should  help
create  a  professional  environment  in  which  practitioners  are  able  to most
34 Kimberlee  K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics Must Keep Pace with Practice:  Plurality in
Lawyering Roles Demands Diverse and Innovative Ethical Standards,  39  IDAHO L. REV.
399, 412  (2003).
35 Id.
36 See,  e.g.,  Emily  Olson,  The  Ethics  of Attorney  Advertising:  The  Effects  of
Different State  Regulatory  Regimes,  18  GEO.  J.  LEGAL  ETHICS  1055,  1056  (2005)
(examining how advertising  affects the ideal of "the chained relationship  of the lawyer to
his  clients,  to  his professional  brethren  and  to  the public")  (quoting the  preface  of the
Model Rules).
37 See David J.  Luban, Freedom and Constraint  in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course
Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49  MD. L.  REv. 424,  444-45  (1990)  (considering
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competently,  efficiently, and successfully produce the best possible result. In
the case of the legal profession, ethical rules should foster optimal conditions
between  lawyers  to  achieve  the goals  of a particular  form of representation,
be it adjudication,  mediation, arbitration,  or some other activity.
In  order to devise meaningful  and truly enabling ethical codes using this
functional  standard, one must work backwards  by initially seeking answers to
several  important,  but  basic  questions:  First,  considering  the  particular
activity  for  which  one  is  to  design  ethical  rules,  what  would  constitute  a
successful  outcome  to  this  process  or  activity?  Answering  this  question
carefully-with  specificity  and  nuance-matters  if one  is  to  succeed  in
developing  an  ethical  code that  will  help  the practitioner  to  achieve  those
goals more successfully.
With the answer to this question in mind,  one  must next consider, what
conditions should exist to increase the likelihood that the parties will achieve
this desired "good"  or "successful"  outcome  as  a result of engaging  in this
process? Again, the more  specific and detailed an answer one can provide to
this question, the more  successful  the drafters of the ethical  code will  be in
promulgating  a set of rules that are both implementable but also useful to the
practitioner.
Finally,  one  must query, what kinds  of behavioral  or ethical  norms will
create  and  thereby  facilitate  a  good  outcome  to  the  process?  Using  the
answer to this question, the ethicist is now prepared to design rules that will
be fitting to the forum or process being used.
Indeed, approaching the design and implementation of ethical codes with
the  notion  that  the  ethical  code  should  fit the  purpose  or  function  of the
professional  role  in  which  the  lawyers  are  to  engage  is  a  profoundly
liberating  and  capacity-building  way  to  develop  such  rules.  Viewing  an
ethical  code  or  set  of  rules  as  potentially  enabling rather  than  limiting
professional behavior turns traditional notions of ethics and ordinary ways of
analyzing or  talking about ethics on  their head.  Instead  of asking  questions
that frame  ethics  as essentially  constraining,  such  as "When  is it legal to lie
in negotiations?," 38 this approach  embraces ethics  as helpful tools that create
an environment  supportive of the process  in which lawyers are engaged. The
transformation  of  ethics  from  "impediment"  or  "barrier"  to  "tool"  and
"facilitator" is a profound and important one.
Ethical codes  should not simply limit or constrain professional behavior,
acting  as  some  kind of floor below  which  one's behavior  is unacceptable;
rather  they  should  guide  and  facilitate  the  performance  of the  established
38 See G. Richard  Shell,  When Is It Legal to Lie in Negotiations?, 32 SLOAN  MGMT.
REv. 93  (1991).
[Vol. 21:1 2005]FITTING THE ETHICS TO THE FORUM
professional  role.39  Adopting  an  approach  to  ethics  that  puts  professional
competence  and success  ahead  of subjective  arguments  about  right, wrong,
truth, or tradition puts into clearer  perspective how we might think about the
efficacy of a particular set of ethical rules for a given activity. It also frees us
from  the  morass  of  debating  divergent  views  of  morality,  values,  and
personal  beliefs.  With  a  functional  approach,  ethics  are  not  about  whose
version  of morality  is  more  praiseworthy,  but rather  about what  climate  is
most suited to ensuring that a particular job (whatever  it may be)  is done in
the best possible way. The latter inquiry, as we will see below,  lends itself to
a  much  more  objective  and  empirically  verifiable  set  of  guidelines  to
codifying ethics. This approach to ethical codes I call "process-enabling."
IV. ADR AND PROCESS-ENABLING  ETHICAL CODES
Since  the  widespread  introduction  of mediation,  arbitration,  consensus-
building,  and other  ADR processes to the  legal  landscape  during the  1970s
and  80s,  legal  ethicists,  ADR  scholars,  and  practitioners  have  struggled  to
understand  how  the  MRPC,  an  ethical  code  designed  primarily  with  the
adversarial process of litigation in mind, might work when lawyers engage in
varying  roles  and  in  processes  that  differ  enormously  from  the  traditional
litigation.40  With  respect  to  mediation  and  arbitration,  the  overwhelming
consensus  has  been that  the  MRPC  were  ill-suited  to the task of providing
appropriate guidance  to lawyers acting as third-party mediators  or advocates
in these  processes. 41 Though  there has  been less  consensus  on exactly how
39 See Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics:  Developing a Code of
Conductfor  International  Arbitration,  23  MICH. J. INT'L L. 341,  357 (2002).
40 See  Carrie  Menkel-Meadow,  The  Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party
Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship  in  Lawyering, 72  TEMP.  L.  REV.  785,  804
(1999)  (asserting  that  the  Model  Rules  provide  little  guidance  to  lawyers  acting  in
alternative  roles);  Menkel-Meadow,  supra note  22,  at  66;  see also supra note  4.  See
generally Pamela  Phillips,  The  Wisdom  of Having a  Representation Agreement-And
What It Should Cover, 824  PLI/PAT  749  (2005);  Nancy  A.  Welsh & Bobbi  McAdoo,
Eyes On the Prize: The Struggle for Professionalism,  DIsP. RESOL. MAG.,  Spring 2005, at
13;  Marshall  J.  Breger,  Should an Attorney  Be Required to Advise  a  Client of ADR
Options?, 13  GEO. J. LEGAL ETICs 427 (2000).
41  "Not surprisingly,  the Model  Rules  as drafted  provided  little guidance to  lawyers
participating  in  ADR. Instead,  they reflected  the then  dominant paradigm:  lawyers  are
advocates in an adversarial  system." Fairman, supra note 4,  at 508-09, citing Douglas H.
Yarn, supra note 4, at 210-12  (footnotes  omitted). See also Kovach, supra note  4; John
Lande,  Possibilities for  Collaborative  Law:  Ethics  and  Practice for  Lawyer
Disqualification  and Process Control in a New  Model of Lawyering, 64  OHIO ST.  L.J.
1315,  1330-60  (2003);  Larry  R.  Spain,  Collaborative Law: A  Critical Reflection  on
Whether a Collaborative  Orientation Can Be Ethically Incorporated  into the Practice  ofOHIO STATE JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
the  organized  bar  should  rectify  this situation, 42 over  time  process-specific
ethical  codes  have been  promulgated  for mediation43  and  for arbitration.44
Each  of these  process-specific  ethical  codes  represents  attempts  to  govern
behavioral  norms  or  expectations  that are  more  appropriate to  the  kind  of
process  for which they  were  designed.  That  is,  to  at least  some extent,  the
existence  of  separate  ethical  codes  for  mediators  and  arbitrators  is  an
acknowledgement that the professional role of the attorney  in these processes
differs from the professional role of the attorney in traditional adjudication.45
Consequently,  the  guidelines  provide  further  clarification  and  direction  for
lawyers engaged in these processes.
Interestingly, even though negotiation  is by far the most extensively used
ADR process,46 to  date  there  has been  no  separate  ethical  code  or  rule  set
developed  for lawyers engaged  in  the process of negotiation.47 Indeed,  only
recently  have  legal  academics  and  ethicists  begun  to  even  consider  the
question  of whether  the  MRPC  are  fitting  or  appropriate  ethical  rules  for
negotiation.48 This is not to say that little has been written about negotiation
ethics. On the contrary, there is a vast literature  on the subject.49 But the vast
Law, 56 BAYLOR L. REv.  141  (2004); Isaacs, supra note 4, at 838-842;  Menkel-Meadow,
supra note  40,  at 804;  Menkel-Meadow,  supra note  4,  at  423.  "[T]he  great  variety  of
roles  and tasks taken  on by third-party neutrals  demonstrates  the failure of the adversary
model  to provide  standards of acceptable behavior in these areas." Id.
42 See,  e.g.,  Peppet,  supra note  4,  at  504-14  (highlighting  some  major  trends,
critiques, and proposed solutions within the area of legal ethics).
43 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 6.
44  See THE  CODE  OF  ETHICS  FOR ARBITRATORS  IN  COMMERCIAL  DISPUTES,  supra
note 9.
45 See Kovach, supra note 34,  at 430. "The  practice of law  will continue to  evolve
and  change...  [A]ttorneys  need to  have  guidance  in  all  aspects  of legal  practice-the
innovative  as well as the more traditional."  Id.
46 See GOLDBERG,  SANDER,  ROGERS & COLE,  supra note 20,  at  17.  "Negotiation-
communication  for  the  purpose  of persuasion-is  the  preeminent  mode  of  dispute
resolution."  Id.
47 See  Peppet,  supra note  4  (arguing  that  the  minimalist  ethical  standard  for
negotiation  remains  because  the alternative  is  to "end  the  legal  profession  as  we know
it").  The  ABA Section  on Litigation  did  promulgate ethical  guidelines  for settlement in
2002,  however.  See ETHICAL  GUIDELINES  FOR  SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS,  supra note
10.
48 See Menkel-Meadow,  supra note 4, at 425.  "Current  legal ethics codes assume a
clear distinction  (based on our adversary system) between  the advocates and the neutral,
impartial  and passive decision-maker who operates at arms-length from the parties." Id
49 See,  e.g., Gerald  B. Wetlaufer,  The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75  IOWA  L.
REv.  1219  (1990);  Carrie  Menkel-Meadow,  Lying  to  Clients for Economic Gain or a
Paternalistic  Judgment:  A  Proposal  for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 761
(1990);  Scott R. Peppet,  ADR Ethics, 54  J. LEGAL  EDUC.  72  (2004);  CARRIE  MENKEL-
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majority of this focuses  on various applications  of the MRPC to  the tension
between  disclosure,  deception,  and  duties that lawyers  have with respect to
their role as  officers  of the court. Many of these  articles focus  narrowly  on
Model  Rule 4.1,  largely ignoring the fact that even though other rules do not
address  negotiation  very  specifically,  the entire  thrust of the rules  breeds a
climate  between  lawyers  that  undermines  a  problem-solving  approach  to
negotiation.50  Very  little  examination  has  been  given  to  the  fundamental
question  of whether the  MRPC  ought  to even  apply to  lawyers engaged  in
negotiation.
While one may imagine  a host of explanations for why there has been so
little  examination  of  whether  the  MRPC  are  the  appropriate  ethical
guidelines  for negotiation, I would suggest two of the primary reasons. First,
many  in  the  legal  profession--even  many  scholars,  practitioners,  and
proponents of ADR-simply do not consider negotiation  as a process that is
truly distinct from litigation.5 i As a student of negotiation,  and one who sees
the tremendous  possibilities of negotiation  for resolving  disputes,  producing
better  outcomes  for  parties,  and  forging  stronger  relationships,  I find  the
failure of many legal  scholars, practitioners,  and others to acknowledge  the
independent  legitimacy  of negotiation  as a process  choice  deeply troubling
and wrong-headed.  Unlike arbitration and mediation, which clearly represent
a  track  apart  from  the  traditional  litigation  route,  negotiation  remains  for
MEADOW  &  MICHAEL  WHEELER,  WHAT'S  FAIR:  ETHICS  FOR  NEGOTIATORS  (2004);
DISPUTE  RESOLUTION  ETHICS-A COMPREHENsIVE  GUIDE (Phillis  Bernard & Bryant G.
Garth eds.,  2002).
50 See James  J. Alfmi, Settlement Ethics and Lawyering in ADR  Proceedings: A
Proposal  to Revise Rule 4.1,  19 N. ILL. U.  L. REv.  255, 269 (1999)  (arguing that Model
Rule 4.1  is inadequate  to support the ethical  needs  of the "settlement  culture");  see also
Fairman, supra note 4, at 525  ("Model Rule 4.1  only prohibits false statements of fact. As
applied  to  negotiation,  the  comments  have  been  used  to  support  an  exception  for
'puffery'-a  euphemism for lying.") (internal footnotes omitted).
51 See Eleanor Holmes  Norton, Bargaining  and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV.  493,  506  (1989).  "[N]egotiation  is  neither  a profession...  nor  a discrete  activity
with  a  defined  mission..  .[but  rather]  a  process  that  takes  place  in  a  multitude  of
contexts."  Id.  That the legal community had long conceived  of negotiation  and litigation
as  inextricably  linked  is  evident  from  a  1985  article  in  which  Carrie Menkel-Meadow
raises the possibility that one  day lawyers might specialize  in negotiation,  separate  from
litigation. See Carrie  Menkel-Meadow,  For and  Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of
the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33  UCLA L.  REV.  485,  492  n.41  (1985),  citing
Roger  Fisher,  What About Negotiation as a Specialty?, 69  A.B.A. J.  1221  (1983).  Cf
Charles Craver, Negotiation Ethics: How to be Deceptive Without Being Dishonest/How
to Be Assertive Without Being Offensive,  38  S.  TEX.  L. REV.  713  (1997)  (asserting  that
most people  do not think of "negotiation" as a typical  ADR process even though  it is,  in
fact, the most basic form of dispute resolution).OHIO STATE  JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
many  nothing  more  than  a  component  of the  litigation  process.52  To  the
degree  that negotiation  is simply considered  as one part of litigation, akin to
filing a complaint, submitting interrogatories,  or conducting a deposition,  it is
unlikely that there will be any serious consideration of whether there ought to
be separate ethical rules for negotiation.
Any  serious  scholar  of  negotiation  understands,  of  course,  that
negotiation,  properly  understood,  is  a  process  entirely  separate  from
litigation.53  Its  purposes,  methods,  and  goals  are  distinct  from  the  set  of
purposes,  methods,  and  goals  that litigators,  mediators,  or  arbitrators  might
adopt.54  Unless  and  until  the  legal  academy  accepts  the  legitimacy  and
integrity  of  the  negotiation  process  as  something  entirely  apart  from
litigation,  it is unlikely that significant attention  will be focused  on whether
the MRPC  ought to apply to lawyers  engaged in negotiation.  And without  a
serious  examination  of this question and  a corresponding  reform  effort, it is
unlikely  that lawyers  will be able  to consistently  deliver outcomes  for their
clients that capitalize  on the features of the negotiation  process that allow for
maximum value-creation  for parties. My own view is that the clock is ticking
on  the  legal  profession  to  acknowledge  this  reality.  The  more  reluctant
lawyers  are to embrace  negotiation  fully  as  a  separate  academic  discipline
and  a  separate  process-choice  for  dispute  resolution,  the  more  the  legal
profession  is  likely  to  be  supplanted  by  conflict  management  consultants,
public  policy  analysts,  businesspeople,  and  those  from  other  related
professions  who  have  the  skill-set  and  training  to  use  negotiation  as  an
independent  problem-solving  process  to  find integrating  outcomes  for their
clients.
To be  clear about  my proposition,  I do  not contend that  lawyers  do  not
bargain or negotiate  as a component part of the  litigation process.  Of course
they  do.  Litigation  typically  involves  negotiations  over various  procedural
52 Norton, supra  note  51,  at 506.
53 See, e.g.,  MENKEL-MEADOW,  LOVE,  SCHNEIDER  &  STERNLIGHT,  supra note 24  at
xxxiv (identifying  negotiation,  mediation, and arbitration  as dispute resolution  processes
separate  from  litigation);  ALAN  S.  RAU,  EDWARD  F.  SHERMAN  &  SCOTT  R.  PEPPET,
PROCESSES  OF DisPuTE RESOLUTION:  THE  ROLE OF LAWYERS  (3d  ed. 2005);  GOLDBERG,
SANDER,  ROGERS  &  COLE,  supra note  20;  see  also Melvin  Aron  Eisenberg,  Private
Ordering Through Negotiation:  Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89  HARV.  L. REV.
637,  639  (1976).  "[O]bservation  suggests  that..,  negotiation  consists  largely  of the
invocation, elaboration, and distinction of principles, rules, and precedents."  Id.
54 See Andrea K. Schneider, Building a Pedagogy of Problem-Solving: Learning to
Choose Among ADR  Processes, 5  HARV.  NEGOT.  L.  REV.  113  (2000)  (distinguishing
negotiation  from  other  ADR  processes  when  determining  how  to  resolve  a  particular
dispute);  see  also  John  Lande,  Why  a  Good Faith Requirement is  a  Bad Idea for
Mediation, 23 ALTERNATIVES  TO  HIGH COST LITIG.  1, 9 (2005).
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and  scheduling matters,  and  in  most  adjudicatory  processes  there  are times
(or at least a time) when parties exchange  offers and demands in an effort to
settle the  dispute. This  exchange is called "negotiation,"  and it is unarguably
a component part of the  larger litigation process  that has been put in motion
months or sometimes years earlier.
What  I argue here, however,  is that apart from the back-and-forth  dance
of demands  and counter-offers  that occurs during litigation,  there also exists
an entirely separate process  of negotiation--one  that is used both  in dispute
resolution  and  deal-making.  This  type  of negotiation  consists  of a  set  of
activities  that  is quite  different  from the  stereotypical  dance  of concessions
and haggling that many think of as "negotiation."  This separate process is the
kind of negotiation that many have been teaching in law and business schools
as  well  as  in  graduate  programs  in  public  policy  for the  past  twenty-five
years.  Skillful  attorneys  with  enlightened  clients  can  choose  this  process
before  a  complaint  is  filed.  When  they  do,  they  engage  in  a  series  of
communications-in  a process-the purpose  and  goals  of which  typically
include  but  are  not  limited  to  simply  resolving  the  dispute  at  hand  via  a
highly ritualized  dance  of concessions.  Negotiation  in this  sense,  then, is  a
process  choice  in  the  same  way  that mediation  and  arbitration  are  process
choices.
A  second reason that could explain why there have been few  proposals
for  a  separate  process-enabling  set of ethics  for  negotiation  is  simple:  the
MRPC  are  actually  well  suited  to  both  litigation  and  negotiation.  I  have
argued above that ethical rules ought to be designed  in ways that facilitate  or
enable  practitioners  of  a  particular  dispute  resolution  process  to  more
effectively  effectuate  a  good  outcome  as  defined  by  the  parameters  or
purpose of the process. That legal mediators and arbitrators have crafted their
own  sets  of ethical  rules  while  legal  negotiators  have not  may  simply  be
explained by the fact that the MRPC are doing an adequate job of supporting
the conditions that allow for successful negotiation  outcomes.  In order to get
an  answer  to  this  question,  we  need  to  better  understand  the  goal  of
negotiation as an independent dispute resolution process.
V. DEFINING SUCCESS OR A GOOD OUTCOME IN NEGOTIATION
Ever  since  Roger  Fisher,  William  Ury,  and  Bruce  Patton  wrote  their
groundbreaking book, Getting  to Yes: Negotiating  Agreement Without Giving
In,55 the fundamental  understanding  of what  constitutes  a good  outcome  in
55  ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM  URY & BRUCE PATRON, GETTING TO YES:  NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT  WITHOUT GIVING  IN (2d ed.  1991).OHIO STATE  JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
negotiation  has been changing. 56 Prior  to the publication of Getting to  Yes,
most  lawyers  had  a  relatively  simplistic  understanding  of  success  in
negotiation.57  For  some,  it  may  have  involved  simply  resolving  a dispute
without having to go to trial.58 For others,  success may have meant  getting a
better  deal than  the  other side,  or claiming  more  value  in the  negotiation.59
During  the  past twenty  years,  however,  negotiation  scholars  have  come  to
understand  that  a problem-solving  or interest-based  approach  to  negotiation
lends  itself  to  a  much  more  sophisticated,  nuanced,  and  advantageous
conception of a good outcome.60
While most  negotiation  instructors  continue  to  expose  their students  to
various  competing models of negotiation, including competitive, adversarial,
and  zero-sum  approaches,  the  vast  majority  of negotiation  teaching  and
pedagogy identifies interest-based negotiation, the goal of which is to expand
the  size  of  the  overall  pie  before  dividing  it,  as  a  "best  practice"  in
negotiation.61 While  a number of formulas  exist to measure  success within a
problem-solving,  principled,  or interest-based approach,  it is  fair to say that
most of us who write and teach about legal negotiation would  define  a good
outcome  in  a  negotiation  as  one  in which  any  agreement  we  reach:  a)  Is
better  than  our  best  alternative  to  a  negotiated  agreement  (BATNA);  b)
56 See, e.g., Valerie A.  Sanchez, Back to the Future of  ADR: Negotiating  Justice and
Human Needs,  18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL.  669, 693  (2003)  (observing  that GETTING
TO  YES  has  become  a "beacon  of enlightenment"  for new  generations of students  and
practitioners that moved negotiation pedagogy from mere description  to prescription);  see
also  Richard  C.  Reuben,  Harvard Conference  Goes  Back  to  Basics:  Teaching  of
Negotiation,  DisP. RESOL. MAG.,  Winter 2000, at 32 (stating that  GETrING TO YES helped
to frame a generation of understanding about the field).
57 FISHER,  URY  & PATTON,  supra note  55,  at  xviii.  "People ...  see  two  ways  to
negotiate:  soft or hard.  The soft negotiator wants to avoid personal conflict and so makes
concessions  readily  in  order  to  reach  agreement.  . . .The  hard  negotiator  sees  any
situation  as a contest of wills in which the side that takes the more extreme position and
holds out longer fares better." Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.  See also ROBERT H. MNOOKIN,  SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW  S.  TULUMELLO,
BEYOND  WINNING:  NEGOTIATING  TO  CREATE  VALUE  IN  DEALS  AND  DISPUTES  3  (2000)
(arguing  that  "[t]he  incentives  to  act  combatively,  selfishly,  or  inefficiently  can  be
compelling").
60 See Bruce Patton, Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION,  supra
note  3, at 279-303.
61 See  Robert  C.  Bordone  &  Robert  H.  Mnookin,  Negotiation Teaching in  Law
Schools,  in  NEGOTIATION  PEDAGOGY:  A  RESEARCH  SURVEY  OF  FOUR  DISCIPLINES
(Program  on  Negotiation  at  Harvard  Law  School  ed.,  2000);  see also  PROGRAM  ON
NEGOTIATION  AT  HARVARD  LAW  SCHOOL  CLEARINGHOUSE,  NEGOTIATION  SYLLABUS
COLLECTION,  available at http://www.pon.org/catalog/product-info.php?products-id=333
(last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
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Meets  our interests very well, the  interests of the other side acceptably,  and
the  interests of any third  parties  who  may be  affected  by  the  agreement  at
least  tolerably  enough  to  be  durable;  c)  Is  the  most  efficient  and  value-
creating  of  many  possible  sets  of  deal  terms;  d)  Is  based  on  a  norm  of
fairness or some  objective standard,  criterion, or principle that is external  to
the parties  themselves;  e)  Identifies  commitments  that are  specific,  realistic,
and  operational  for  both  sides;  f)  Is  premised  on  clear  and  efficient
communication;  and g)  Improves  or  at  least  does not harm  the  relationship
between  the  parties  where  "relationship"  is  defined  as  the  ability  of the
parties to manage their differences well.62
The above  definition of a good outcome  is one that is accepted to a large
degree by virtually anyone  who teaches  and studies negotiation. At its core, it
recognizes that, unlike the situation in litigation  and arbitration, and even, to
a certain  extent, in mediation, the value-added of negotiation  from a process
perspective is the potential to use creativity and mutual information exchange
to produce deals that actually enlarge the size of the pie for the parties.
Admittedly, many in the legal profession still might reject the notion that
legal  negotiation  has  a  unique  capacity  to  help  parties  create  value  when
conducted properly,  and  that any  definition of success  for negotiation  must
therefore  be measured  simply by whether  the final result  did, in fact,  claim
the  most value  available  from  a fixed pie.63 While  these  people  are  free to
defend older, more traditional  notions  of negotiation  as nothing more than a
dance  of concessions  and  a  battle  of wills,  the  overwhelming  majority  of
negotiation  scholars  and  practitioners  recommend  that  lawyers  adopt  an
integrative  or value-creating  approach  to negotiation.64 For these  reasons,  I
argue that  the  definition  of a good  outcome  for negotiation  outlined  above
reasonably  encapsulates  the  overwhelming  view  of  most  legal  and
negotiation  scholars.  Those  who  would  continue  to  disagree  with  this, 65
62 See Patton, supra  note 60; See also Roger Fisher, A  Code of  Negotiation Practices
for Lawyers, 1 NEGOT. J.  105, 107-08 (1985).
63 See, e.g.,  Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative  Bargaining,  85  GEo. L.J.
369  (1996);  Peter Robinson,  Contending with  Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: A Cautiously
Cooperative Approach to  Mediation Advocacy,  50  BAYLOR  L.  REv.  963,  966  (1998)
(pointing  out  that  when  negotiators  assume  a  zero-sum  game,  they  are  compelled  to
behave competitively);  Charles A.  Goldstein & Sarah L. Weber,  The Art of Negotiating,
37  N.Y.L.  SCH.  L.  REv.  325,  338  (1992).  "[A]lthough  you  should  take  pains  to
understand  the objectives of your opponent, whether  or not your opponent  has achieved,
or failed to achieve, his or her objectives  is immaterial if you have achieved yours." Id.
64 See, e.g.,  Wetlaufer, supra note  63,  at  369  n. 1 (citing  a long  list of negotiation
scholars who recommend an integrative approach to bargaining).
65  I acknowledge that there continue to be a small number of law school negotiation
teachers  who  continue  to  teach  students  that  deception  and  value  claiming  are  mostOHIO STATE JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
while  free  to hold  their  opinions,  are  part  of an ever-shrinking  minority  of
those  who  continue  to teach  "tricks  and tips"  as  the preferred  approach to
legal negotiations.
VI.  CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO FACILITATE A GOOD OUTCOME  IN THE
NEGOTIATION  PROCESS
Stipulating for now that  my definition of a good  outcome  is  a fair  and
reasonable one that is widely taught, I review the circumstances or conditions
necessary  to  help  parties  in  negotiation  arrive  at  such  a  good  outcome.
Thanks  to  the  empirical  work  of  colleagues  in  game  theory,  social  and
cognitive psychology, behavioral  economics,  and other related  disciplines, a
bounty of scholarship produced during the last thirty years provides evidence
of what conditions best facilitate  integrating outcomes in negotiation.66
For example, we know that mutual  information exchange enables parties
to identify value-creating trades,  areas in which they can  exploit differences
between them to enlarge the  size of the overall pie.  Indeed,  Howard Raiffa,
in a series of famous lectures  he delivered at Harvard, posited that maximum
overall value creation occurs under conditions of FOTE:  Full, Open, Truthful
Exchange. 67  While  one-hundred  percent  FOTE  rarely,  if  ever,  occurs  in
negotiation  because  of concerns  regarding  the  division  of the  pie,68  it  is
nonetheless  true  that  the  more  comfortable  the  parties  feel  divulging
important in negotiation.  See, e.g., Craver, supra note 51,  at 715-24; Michael Meltsner &
Philip Schrag, Negotiating Tactics for Legal Services Lawyers, in WHAT'S  FAIR:  ETHICS
FOR  NEGOTIATORS  205-  11  (Carrie  Menkel-Meadow  &  Michael  Wheeler  eds.,  2004);
James J. White, Machiavelli and  the Bar: Ethical Limitations  on Lying in Negotiation, in
WHAT'S  FAIR:  ETHICS  FOR  NEGOTIATORS  91-107  (Carrie  Menkel-Meadow  &  Michael
Wheeler  eds.,  2004)  (asserting  that deceptive  and  misleading  an  opponent  about  one's
true position is a necessary part of all negotiation).
66 See,  e.g.,  MAX  H.  BAZERMAN,  JUDGMENT  IN MANAGERIAL  DECISION  MAKING
134-51  (2002); ROBERT B. CIALDINI. INFLUENCE:  SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 136-70 (3d ed.
1993);  HOWARD  RAIFFA,  THE  ART  AND  SCIENCE  OF  NEGOTIATION  (1982);  LEIGH  L.
THOMPSON,  THE  MIND  AND  HEART  OF  THE  NEGOTIATOR  9-31  (2d  ed.  2001);  Linda
Babcock  &  George  Loewenstein,  Explaining Bargaining Impasse:  The Role  of Self-
Serving Biases,  11  J.  ECON.  PERSP.  109  (1997);  Herbert  C.  Kelman,  The Interactive
Problem-Solving  Approach, in MANAGING GLOBAL  CHAOS:  SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES
TO INTERNATIONAL  CONFLICT 501-19  (Chester A. Crocker,  Fen 0. Hampson  & Pamela
Aall eds.,  1996).
6 7 HOWARD  RAIFFA,  LECTURES  ON  NEGOTIATION  ANALYSIS  6  (1996);  see  also
RAIFFA, supra note 66,  at  306 (pointing  out that the  subjects  in  a particular  simulation
"who did best empirically were the ones who simply announced the truth-the ones who
did not misrepresent") (emphasis  in original).
68 See MNOOKIN  ET AL., supra note 59, at 17.
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information  about  their  true  interests  and preferences,  the  more  likely  it  is
that value will be created.69
We  also  know  that negotiators  who  have  high  mutual  trust 70  between
them  are  more  likely to  share  information  between  them  and more  able  to
brainstorm creatively to facilitate a good outcome.71
Other  factors  that  increase  the  likelihood  of parties  obtaining  a value-
maximizing,  Pareto-optimal  outcome  in  negotiation  include  engaging  in
informal  small  talk  and  communication, 72  increased  listening,73  especially
increased use of open-ended questioning by both sides, and the adoption of a
more relational approach.74 We also know that parties who have been trained
in interest-based bargaining  are more likely to find value-creating  trades than
those  who  have  not,75 and  that parties  who  have been  exposed  to  various
69 Cf  id  at 207  (discussing how creating  a collaborative  working relationship  with
the  lawyer  on  the  other  side  and  promoting  effective  communication  can  promote
problem-solving).
70  Matthew A.  Cronin & Laurie R. Weingart, The Differential  Roles of Respect and
Trust  on  Negotiation,  IACM  18th  Annual  Conference  (2005),  available  at
http://ssm.com/abstract=726183  (last visited Oct.  17, 2005). In this case,  I define trust as
the willingness to be vulnerable to another person in the absence of monitoring.
71  See THOMPSON, supra note 66, at 109-36.
72 See,  e.g.,  Kathleen  L.  McGinn,  Leigh  Thompson &  Max  H.  Bazerman,  Dyadic
Processes of Disclosure and Reciprocity  in  Bargaining with  Communication,  16  J.
BEHAV.  DECISION  MAKING  17,  19 (2003) (citing  a host of empirical  studies that  indicate
that parties  who  engage  in  communication  produce more  efficient  outcomes  than those
who  are not  permitted to  do so);  Kathleen  Valley, Leigh  Thompson,  Robert Gibbons &
Max  H.  Bazerman,  How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining  Games, 38
GAMES  & ECON.  BEHAV.  127,  150  (2002);  see also Robert  M.  Bastress  & Joseph  D.
Harbaugh,  Taking  the  Lawyer's  Craft  into  Virtual  Space:  Computer-Mediated
Interviewing, Counseling, and  Negotiating, 10 CLINICAL L. REV.  115,  142 (2003)  (noting
that  "[i]nformal  CMC  'chat'  (the  online  version  of  'small  talk')  has  been  found  to
promote  good working relationships, just as it does in...  [face-to-face]  relations").
73 See  Neil  Rackham  &  John  Carlisle,  The  Effective  Negotiator-Part 1:  The
Behavior of Successful Negotiators,  Vol.  2,  No. 6, J. OF EUR. INDUS.  TRAINING  6 (1978);
Neil  Rackham  &  John  Carlisle,  The  Effective  Negotiator-Part 2:  The  Behavior of
Successful Negotiators, Vol.  2,  No.  7,  J.  OF  EuR.  INDUS.  TRAINING  2  (1978)  (showing
how  more  successful  negotiators  tended  to  reflect  back  the  concerns  of others,  test
understanding,  and seek information by asking questions  more often than  those who are
just average negotiators).
74  See David A. Binder, Paul Bergman  & Susan C. Price, Lawyers as Counselors, in
ALTERNATIVE  DISPUTE  RESOLUTION:  STRATEGIES  FOR  LAW  AND  BusINEss  51-67  (E.
Wendy Trachte-Huber  & Stephen K. Huber eds.,  1996).
7 5 See MAX H. BAZERMAN  & MARGARET A. NEALE,  NEGOTIATING  RATIONALLY  112
(1992)  (describing  a  study  where  managers  who  trained  in  integrative  negotiationOHIO STATE JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
cognitive and psychological  biases such as self-serving  bias,  overconfidence
bias,  and the  fundamental  attribution  error  are  less  likely  to  fall  victim  to
these  biases  and  therefore  more  likely  to  succeed  at  reaching  a  mutually
acceptable outcome.
76
VII. Do THE MRPC  CREATE CONDITIONS TO ENABLE  OR FACILITATE  A
GOOD OUTCOME  IN NEGOTIATION?
With  the  knowledge  that  negotiators  are  most  likely  to  achieve  a
successful  outcome  under  conditions  where  trust  is  high,  relationships  are
strong,  information  about preferences  is  shared reciprocally,  and parties  are
encouraged  to brainstorm  rather than  be  constrained  by  their own partisan
perceptions  of possibilities,  we  can  ask whether  the  MRPC  help  to  create
these conditions in negotiation.
The only rule that addresses  legal negotiation specifically  is Model  Rule
4.1.  It states,
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a)  make  a false statement of material fact or law to a third person;  or
(b)  fail  to  disclose  a  material  fact  when  disclosure  is  necessary  to
avoid  assisting  a  criminal  or  fraudulent  act  by  a  client,  unless
disclosure is prohibited by Rule  1.6.
77
On  its  face,  this  rule  does  not encourage  the  free  flow  of information
between  the  parties.  Nor  does  it  necessarily  discourage  that  free  flow  of
information  unless  such information  exchange  would  violate  the provisions
relating to client confidentiality  found in Model Rule  1.6.
However,  Comment  2  to  Model  Rule  4.1  eviscerates  much  of  the
ostensibly neutral thrust of the rule by stating:
Under  generally  accepted  conventions  in  negotiation,  certain types  of
statements  ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates
of  price  or  value  placed  on  the  subject  of  a transaction  and  a  party's
intentions  as to  an  acceptable  settlement  of a  claim  are  ordinarily  in this
practices  outperformed  negotiators  who  had  lots  of  experience  but  no  training  in
integrative techniques).
76 See Max H.  Bazerman  & Katie  Shonk,  The Decision Perspective to Negotiation,
in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION,  supra note 3,  at 53.
77 MODEL RULES  OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2004).
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category,  and  so  is the existence  of an  undisclosed  principal  except where
nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.78
With respect to negotiation,  then, Comment 2 undercuts  the  spirit, if not
the  letter, of the  rule  itself, stripping  it of virtually  any  meaning  except  to
proscribe  bald-faced  material  lies. As  Gary  Tobias  Lowenthal writes,  under
the MRPC the ABA  has "unambiguously  embraced  'New  York hardball'  as
the official standard of practice." 79 In short, the Model Rules allow attorneys
to  misrepresent  their client's  bottom  line reservation  price  as well  as  their
general intentions during negotiation without any risk of violating an  ethical
norm.
80
Moreover,  Model  Rule  1.6,  which  deals  with  client  confidentiality,
prohibits an  attorney  from  disclosing  information  relating  to representation
without  the  client's  consent  unless  the  lawyer  believes  that  revealing  the
information  is necessary  to prevent certain  death or substantial bodily harm,
or to rectify  a narrow range of crimes or fraud by the client.81 Interpreted  in
tandem,  Model  Rules  4.1  and  1.6  create  conditions  that permit  lawyers  to
engage  in hard bargaining tactics  that are  misleading  and deceptive  without
risk of official sanction.82
Indeed,  commentators who have examined the Model Rules with respect
to  their  appropriateness  for problem-solving  negotiation  agree  that,  rather
than helping to create the conditions  that enable or facilitate a good outcome
in negotiation,  the rules tend to  do just the opposite:  they tend to encourage
dissembling  behavior  that borders  on  lying,  inviting  distrust,  bluffing,  and
puffery into the negotiation process.83 Because the Model Rules were  drafted
78  MODEL RULES OF PROF.  CONDUCT R. 4.1,  cmt. 2 (2004).
79 Gary  Tobias  Lowenthal,  The Bar's Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining  by
Lawyers, 2  GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411,445 (1988).
80 See Peppet, supra note 4, at 498, 499 n.85; see also Craver, supra note 51,  at 715.
81  See MODEL RULES OF PROF.  CONDUCT R. 1.6(a)-(b) (2004).
82 See Peppet, supra note 4, at 499; Craver, supra  note  51,  at 715.
83  See Reed  Elizabeth  Loder,  Moral Truthseeking and the  Virtuous Negotiator, 8
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45,  74 (1994)  (arguing that "good reasons weigh against using the
Model  Rule's  preliminary  approach  to  exclude  some  conduct  from  the  definition  of
deception");  see also James J. Alfini,  Trashing,  Bashing, and  Hashing  It Out: Is This the
End of "Good Mediation?,"  19  FLA.  ST.  U.  L. REV.  47  (1991);  Steven  C.  Krane, Ethics
2000: What Might Have Been,  19 N.  ILL. U. L. REV. 323,  327-28 (1999)  (as worded, the
Model  Rules  enable  and  perhaps  encourage  lawyers  to  "practice  at  the  margins  of
propriety");  Kovach, supra note 4,  at 948  (noting that  the "ethical  rules  that  currently
govern lawyers were written with the adversary system  in mind. The underpinnings of the
adversary  system, with  a  focus  on competition  and  winning  at  all  costs,  provide  the
context for the lawyer's work").OHIO STATE  JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
with  the  profoundly adversarial  process  of litigation  in mind,84 their  entire
thrust  presumes  adversarialism  rather than  cooperation.  Given  the  goals  of
litigation as a process designed to persuade  a third party of the truth or falsity
of a certain  set of events  or allegations,  promulgating  rules  that encourage
sharp  adversarialism  and  that  set  limits  on  aggressive  behavior  may  well
make sense.
However, the goals of negotiation  are  substantially  different from those
of litigation.  In  light  of this,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  the  ethical  rules
designed to facilitate  a good outcome  in litigation  would be  ill-suited to the
negotiation  context.  Ethical  guidelines  are  not  one-size-fits-all. 85  To  the
degree that ethical  guidelines are designed to facilitate or enable parties to do
their  best in  a particular  activity,  they must  be  geared  with the  activity in
mind. It is perfectly appropriate  behavior for spectators at a baseball game to
carry  on  private  conversations,  join  in  the  "wave,"  eat,  drink,  and  cheer
loudly  while  the  game  is  in  play.  Behavior  such  as  this  that  might  be
distracting in another context  does not adversely  affect the quality of play on
the field. One  would not, however, apply the norm of behavior  for baseball
spectators  to  golf spectators  on  the  theory that  both  baseball  and  golf are
sports. Because  of the concentration  required  of a professional  golf player,
were  spectators  to  carry  on  independent  conversations,  do  the  "wave,"  or
shout and cheer it would impede the golfer's ability to play the best possible
game.  Consequently,  the behavioral  norms  for each  sport  have  evolved  to
optimize the quality of play-the quality of the outcome for the sport.
As  it  now  stands,  unfortunately,  the  ethical  guidelines  that  apply  to
negotiation  are  wholly  inapt. Though changes  in legal  education  during the
past twenty-five  years  have  put interest-based,  problem-solving  negotiation
firmly on the map, 86 educators  and leaders  in the legal profession have done
little  to  change  the  ethical  guidelines-that  is,  the  behavioral  norms  and
expectations-that  young  lawyers will  face  once  they enter  the profession.
This would be like spending thousands of dollars  on golf lessons for a child,
throwing that child on a course  where spectators  are howling,  cheering,  and
drinking beer, and then wondering why the child is not playing golf the way
she  was  taught  to  play.  If negotiation  as  a  process  is  to  achieve  its  full
potential-that  is, if lawyers  are  to be  able  to capitalize  on the promise  of
84 See Kovach, supra  note 34, at 405.
85 See Carrie  Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and  the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the
Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL  L. REv.  1159,  1161  (1995)  (arguing that ethics  rules
need to be re-crafted to take account of new forms of representation  by lawyers).
86 See MENKEL-MEADOW  ET AL., supra note 24,  at xxxv (discussing how the study
of negotiation,  mediation,  and other problem-solving  processes  became institutionalized
in American  legal education in the thirty years since the Pound Conference of 1976).
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negotiation  as a process  independent  of litigation-then  the bar must make
serious efforts to reform the ethical  code under which legal negotiators must
act.
I  would  like  to  distinguish  my  argument  here  from  some  of those
criticizing  the Model Rules  in the context of ADR for their emphasis  on the
lawyer's  duty of zealous  representation.87  In my  view,  the duty  of zealous
advocacy  is  not the problem.  Whether  a  lawyer  is representing  a  client  in
mediation,  arbitration,  litigation,  or negotiation,  a  goal of zealous  advocacy
in the  interest of the client  is laudable.  We need not back away  from this in
any  re-design  of ethics  rules  for  negotiators.  The  problem  is  not  zealous
advocacy,  but rather  what  zealous  advocacy  might  mean  in the  context  of
each  individual  dispute  resolution  process.  In  litigation,  zealous  advocacy
means winning an argument by persuading a third party (a jury or judge) that
your version of events or your understanding of the law is true or correct. On
the  other  hand,  in  negotiation,  zealous  advocacy  entails  identifying  the
underlying interests of the client and then employing one's skills of listening,
creativity, and joint problem-solving  to best meet those  interests  and attain a
satisfying  and  efficient  outcome.88 The problem  is not  the norm  of zealous
advocacy but rather that the Model Rules themselves, taken as a whole, treat
zealous  advocacy  as  an  aspect  of  an  adversarial  battle.  Rule  4.1  only
exacerbates  this  tendency.  Whereas  this  may  be  effective  in  the
fundamentally  adversarial  context  of litigation, applying  this  same  template
to negotiation  tends  to  foster  clumsy  agreements,  leave  potential  value  left
unrealized, and produce unnecessary impasse.
87 Kovach,  supra note 4, at 949.
The  demands  of  law  practices  today  seem  to  compel  even  more  extreme
behavior,  all of which  is employed in the name of zealous representation. Even the
profession  itself realizes  that constant  conduct in a contentious  and litigious manner
takes  it  toll.  Lawyers  report  increased  pressure  in  a  ferociously  competitive
marketplace  and  complain  about having  to work  in an  adversarial  environment  'in
which  aggression,  selfishness,  hostility,  suspiciousness,  and  cynicism  are
widespread.
Id; see also Fairman,  supra note 4,  at 520-22  (outlining the debate between  those who
believe  that zeal  is appropriate  for ADR and those who  do not); Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 4, at 427.
88 See,  e.g.,  Jean  R.  Sternlight, Lawyers'  Representation of Clients in Mediation:
Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial  Setting, 14
OHIO  ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 269, 291-97 (1999).OHIO STATE  JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
VIII. TOWARD  A NEW ETHICS OF LEGAL NEGOTIATION
This  Article  is  not the first  to posit that the  ethical guidelines  provided
for  in  the  MRPC  and  the  behavioral  expectations  of the  problem-solving
lawyer are not well-aligned  with the behavioral  expectations of the problem-
solving lawyer.89 Recognizing that the adversarial  bent of the MRPC  makes
problem-solving negotiation  an even more difficult task for lawyers than for
other  professionals  not  bound  by  such  ethical  guidelines,  academics  have
proposed a number  of ways that attorneys  might  be  able to achieve  a  good
outcome  in  negotiation  despite  the  unhelpful  "noise"  created  by  ethical
norms  that  result  in  conditions  hostile  to  value  creation  and  collaborative
negotiating.
Leveraging  the  fact  that  lawyers  often  negotiate  with  each  other
repeatedly  and,  as  a result,  tend  to  gain  reputations  either  as  collaborating
problem-solvers  or  as  difficult  bargainers,  Ronald  Gilson  and  Robert
Mnookin  have  suggested  that  individual  lawyers  might  consider  creating
more  robust  reputational  markets  for  problem-solving.  By  so  doing,  they
could  signal  to  potential  clients  that  those  who  have  a  desire  to  use
negotiation  as  a  way  to  create  value  might  consider  hiring  them  for  their
collaborative  reputation.
90
More  formal  proposals  outside  the  creation  and  use  of  reputational
markets typically adopt some kind of contracts-based approach to negotiation
ethics.  Chief  among  the  proponents  of  these  have  been  members  of the
growing  collaborative  law  movement,  which  operates  especially  in  family
law, though  is now  expanding  to  other contexts  as well. 91 The  idea behind
collaborative  lawyering  is  simple.  Lawyers  involved  in collaborative  law
associations  in  a particular  state  all  receive  mandatory training  in interest-
based, problem-solving  negotiation. In addition,  they often agree  to abide by
a modified  set of ethical rules that are specific  to the state  in which they are
practicing.92  These  ethical  rules  typically  include  duties  of  candor,  good
89 See supra notes 40-41.
90 See  Ronald  J.  Gilson  &  Robert  H.  Mnookin,  Disputing  Through  Agents:
Cooperation  and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation,  94  COLUM.  L. REv.  509,  525-
27 (1994).
91  Pauline  H.  Tesler, Collaborative  Law: A New Paradigm  for Divorce Lawyers, 5
PSYCHOL.  PUB.  POL'Y  & L.  967  (1999);  see also James  K.L.  Lawrence,  Collaborative
Lawyering: A New Development in Conflict Resolution, 17  OHIO  ST.  J.  ON  DisP. RESOL.
431  (2002);  Sheila  M.  Gutterman  et  al.,  Collaborative Law: A New Model for Dispute
Resolution, COLO.  LAWYER, Dec. 2004, at 59; Lande, supra  note 41.
92 See TEx. FAM.  CODE ANN.  § 6.603  (2001)  (Texas  was the  first  state to  formally
sanction  the  use  of collaborative  law  in  its  statutory  code);  see,  e.g.,  PRINCIPLES  OF
COLLABORATIVE  LAW  (Collab.  Law  Inst.  of  Ga.),  available  at
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faith,  and  fair  play  as  well  as  provisions  that  shift  the  norms  away  from
haggling and dissembling and toward more productive information  exchange
and  brainstorming.  Collaborative  lawyers  and  the  parties  who  hire  them
agree  that  the  collaborative  attorneys  will  serve  their  clients  only  during
negotiation.93  Should  the  clients  decide  to  change  processes  and  move
toward litigation, the collaborative  lawyers withdraw from representation  and
the  clients  agree  to  hire  other lawyers  for  the  litigation  stage.94  The  idea
behind collaborative  lawyering  is that the  commitment of both  lawyers  and
clients  on all  sides to  withdraw  from  representation  if the negotiation  fails
signals the intention of both sides to participate  in the negotiation  process  in
a  spirit of cooperation  and good  faith.  It  signals  to each  side that the  other
will  be more  forthcoming  with  information  about  their  interests  and  more
trusting in their interactions with each other. Because lawyers involved in the
collaborative  lawyering  movement  have  been  trained  in  interest-based
bargaining, they are also aware of how  to create  value in negotiation. Hence,
the private  ordering  involved  here  separates the  negotiation  process  cleanly
from the  litigation process and the modified  set of ethical  rules  involved in
collaborative  lawyering  helps  create  the  conditions  necessary  to  achieve  a
good outcome.
95
In  a  growing  number  of  cases,  Collaborate  Law  Participation
Agreements  (CLPAs)  create  contracts  that  require  honest  disclosure.  For
example,  Collaborative Lawyers  in Arizona  agree that the parties  will "give
full,  honest,  and  open  disclosure  of all  information,  whether  requested  or
not."'96  Cincinnati's  CLPA  states  that participation  in the  collaborative  law
process  is "based upon  the assumption that  both parties  have  acted in good
faith  and  have provided  complete  and  accurate  information  to  the  best  of
their ability."
'97
Collaborative  law  and  other  private  contracting  between  lawyers  for
ethical  rules more  suited  to negotiation  are gaining  in popularity,  signaling
the growing acknowledgement  that negotiation has tremendous  promise  and
capacity  to create value  for clients when  lawyers  can  find ways to increase
trust, cooperation, and truthful information exchange.
http://www.collaborativelawga.com/principles.html  (last  visited  Oct.  17,  2005);
PRINcIPLEs  AND  GUIDELINES  FOR  THE PRACTICE  OF  COLLABORATIvE  LAW,  available at
http://www.mediate.com/articles/collabpg.cfm  (last visited Oct. 17,  2005).
93 Lawrence, supra note 91,  at 432.
94 Id.
95 See supra Part VI.
96 See Peppet, supra  note 4, at 492 n.59.
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However,  because  collaborative law  is  essentially a private  contract still
subject  to  the  supervening  ethical  norms  and  expectations  of  the  legal
profession,  problems  exist with  this  approach  to negotiation.  For  example,
there  is  much  debate  about  whether  lawyers  can  ethically  "recuse"
themselves  from  the  prevailing  MRPC  that  govern  all  lawyer  behavior.98
Secondly,  enforceability  of these contracts remains  an open and unanswered
question.99  Questions  of enforceability  arise  at  two  levels:  (1)  are  these
agreements  legally enforceable in court at all?100 and  (2)  if they are, what is
the  reasonable  likelihood that  an individual attorney  will bring  suit against
another  attorney to enforce  these rules  given the cost such plaintiff attorney
would  need to incur  to  enforce  the  contract?  Finally,  some  have  expressed
concern  about how attorneys'  duty of zealous  advocacy  squares with mutual
commitments  of  collaborative  law  attorneys  not  to  pursue  litigation  if
settlement fails. 1° 1
A third way  that some  academics  have tried to address  the problem  of
ethics rules not matching up with the realities  of practice has been to  call for
individualized  ethical  rules  for  particular  practice  areas.10 2  This  context-
98 See Spain, supra note 41,  at 153.
[T]he practice  of collaborative  law seems  to place  an  attorney somewhere  on
the  continuum of a  lawyer  acting in  a  neutral,  non-representational  capacity  as a
mediator  and  a  lawyer  acting  in  a  representative  capacity  zealously  representing
their client's interests.  This  may be a  particularly difficult  role for a  collaborative
lawyer to balance.
Id.  (internal  footnotes  omitted);  see also Isaacs,  supra note 4,  at  842  (noting  that
collaborative  law  has  not  resolved  its  ethical  questions  and requires  attention  and
internal solutions from practitioners).
99 See Peppet, supra note 4, at 479.
100 Id. at 513-14.
101 See  Lande,  supra note  41,  at  1331  (arguing  that  the  mandatory  withdrawal
provisions in collaborative law agreements  do not violate the duty of zealous advocacy).
102 See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Ethics in Estate Planning  and Fiduciary  Administration:
The Inadequacy of the Model Rules and the Model Code, 45  RECORD  715,  763  (1990)
(suggesting  an ethics  code  designed  for estate planners);  Stanley  Sporkin,  The Need  for
Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the  Various Specialties, 7  GEO.  J. LEGAL
ETHICS  149,  150-52  (1993)  (recommending  the  creation  of separate  ethics  codes  for
corporate and securities practice);  Fred C. Zacharias, Fact  and  Fiction in the Restatement
of  the Law Governing Lawyers: Should the Confidentiality Provisions  Restate the Law?,
6 GEO.  J. LEGAL ETHICS  903,  930-31  (1993)  (suggesting that the American  Law Institute
consider  drafting  specialized  ethical  codes);  cf  David  B.  Wilkins,  Legal Realism for
Lawyers, 104 HARv.  L. REV. 468, 515 (1990).  As Wilkins explains:
[W]e must abandon the traditional model's commitment to general,  universally
applicable ethical  rules. General  limitations on zealous advocacy  purporting to bind
all  lawyers  in all  contexts create  only  the illusion  of controlling  lawyer discretion
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based  approach  to ethics  has been heralded for a whole range  of specialties
from family law to real estate to bankruptcy to criminal law. 1 0 3 Practice-area
or  context-specific  ethics  codes  have  the  advantage  of allowing  increased
tailoring to the  intricacies of the  law within a certain context. However,  this
approach  also  poses  a  range  of  problems.  First  among  them  is  that
introducing  context-specific  ethics  codes  might  spawn  literally  dozens  of
ethical  codes,  creating  a  mass  of  confusion  for  clients,  lawyers,  and  the
profession.  Secondly, such a solution would give rise to an entirely new area
of law,  one  we  might  call,  "conflict  of ethics."  Figuring  out  which  ethics
rules  might  apply  in  a  case  that involved  bankruptcy,  a divorce,  and  real
estate  issues  would  be  no  easy  task.  Would  the  parties  in  such  a  case
negotiate  to determine  which  ethical rules they  would  follow?  Would there
be  a  multi-practice  set of ethical  rules  that tried to split the  difference?  Or
would  there be  a hierarchy  of ethical rules?  The  morass  such  an  approach
might create would lead to more problems than the ill-fitting unitary system
we already have.
Recently,  Professor  Scott  Peppet  proposed  a  fourth  approach  to  the
problem of ethics with respect to legal negotiation  in the Iowa Law Review.
The  quandary  his  proposal  addresses  relates  to  what  he  calls  the
"Collaborator's  Sorting Problem." 1 04 That is, well-trained lawyers  who may
want  to  negotiate  in  a  collaborative  and  problem-solving  way  may  feel
constrained  from  doing so  because  they  cannot  distinguish,  at  first glance,
other  lawyers  like  themselves  from  those  who  may  adopt  a  more  hard-
headed, zero-sum bargaining  style. Peppet's piece  analyzes the various ways
in which  academics  and  practitioners  have  sought  to  address  this  sorting
problem,  including  Gilson  and Mnookin's  proposal  to develop  reputational
markets and others'  various models for collaborative  law and contract-based
approaches. He finds  all of these to fall short of their aspiration. 1 0 5
In their stead,  Peppet  proposes what he  calls a  contract  model  of legal
ethics. 1 0 6 Peppet's model responds  to the shortcomings  of Gilson/Mnookin's
because they ignore the extent to which that discretion  is inevitably  reintroduced  in
interpretation and application.
Id.  (citing  Marc  S.  Galanter,  Why  the  "Haves"  Come Out Ahead: Speculations on  the
Limits of  Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV.  95,  147 (1974)).
103 See,  e.g.,  Bruce  A.  Green  & Bernardine  Dohrn,  Foreword: Children and the
Ethical Practice of Law, 64  FoRDHAM  L. REV.  1281,  1296  (1996);  Nancy B. Rapoport,
Our House, Our Rules: The  Need for a  Uniform  Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM.
BANKR.  INST.  L. REV.  45  (1998);  Bruce  A.  Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The
Intersection of the Ethical  Codes and  the Criminal  Law, 69 N.C. L. REV. 687 (1991).
104 See Peppet, supra  note 4, 481-484.
105 Id. at 485.
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reputational  approach  as  well  as  to  the  shortcomings  of  collaborative
lawyering with respect to various ethical  questions and enforceability  issues.
Under Peppet's proposal,  lawyers would be permitted to enter into contracts
for collaboration  that would "explicitly trigger public  disciplinary  sanctions
in the  event of breach."' 1 0 7 However, in order to ensure enforcement of these
standards  by the bar,  lawyers  would be  limited  in  their  ability  to  contract.
They  would  need  to  choose  one  of several  sets  of pre-determined  ethical
rules  made  available  to  them  by  the bar.1 0 8  According  to  Peppet,  such  an
approach would preserve  what he  calls "moral  pluralism"  in the profession,
or the idea that  lawyers  are unlikely to agree upon  the appropriate  limits of
deception  in  negotiation  or  the  best  way  to  approach  legal  negotiation  in
terms of misrepresentation, bluffing, and the like. 109 Given the wide range of
views on this issue, it would be futile in Peppet's view, to impose some kind
of normative  approach  on  lawyers. At the same  time, however,  by limiting
the number of ethical regimes lawyers  can choose from to a  montage of bar-
approved options, Peppet's  contracts approach preserves the advantages  that
a centralized,  reliable,  and  predictable  ethics  code  provides  as  well  as  the
advantages  that a uniform regulatory approach gives toward  structuring and
containing a profession."10
Peppet's proposal  is  bold, nuanced,  and well-articulated.  Helpfully,  he
explains  his  proposal  by  revealing  the  assumptions  and  reasoning  upon
which  he  bases  his  contractarian  model.  His  goal  is  to  strike  a  balance
between  those  who  would  prefer  a  more  discretionary  approach  to  legal
ethics, one  that stresses  the autonomy  of clients  and  lawyers and-what  he
considers  to  be  the  inevitable  "moral  pluralism"  of the  profession-those
who  favor  a  uniform  approach  to  legal  ethics  on  the  ground  that  ethical
guidelines provide  structure  and guidance to lawyers that they  need to make
their  ethical  decisions  easier and more  certain. Peppet's  proposal  addresses
the  concerns  represented  by these  various  viewpoints  and  does  so,  in  my
view, exceedingly well, given the assumptions upon which it is based.
IX.  THE CASE FOR A PROCESS-ENABLING  ETHICAL CODE IN
NEGOTIATION
Peppet's  call  for  a  contractarian  model  endeavors  to  address  the
collaborator's  sorting  problem.  In  crafting  my  proposal  for  a  process-
enabling  ethical  code  for  negotiation,  I  adopt  a  somewhat  different  set  of
107 Id.  at 514.
1 0 8 Id.  at 518.
109 Id.  at 510.
'1 0 Id.  at 519.
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assumptions  and, in  so  doing, address  a related,  but different problem.  The
call  for  an  ethical  code  for  lawyers  that  is  tailored  to  the  process  of
negotiation  and  mandatory  with  respect  to  negotiation  therefore  differs
considerably  from  that  offered  by  Peppet  but  is  at  least  as  sweeping  and
foundational  in its scope. Indeed,  it swallows Peppet's  solution by obviating
his  problem:  under  my  proposal,  all  lawyers  acting  as  negotiators  would
necessarily be  collaborators.  Under my proposal,  failure  to negotiate  with a
collaborative  approach  would  constitute  a violation  of the ethical  rules  of
legal negotiation.
My proposal is simple: Given that the common understanding of success
or  a good  outcome  in  negotiation  has  evolved  during  the past  thirty years
thanks to the research of those  in other academic  disciplines,  such  as social
and cognitive  psychology and behavioral economics,"'  lawyers must update
the ethical code for negotiation so that it maximizes the likelihood of creating
conditions between the lawyers for them to achieve this good outcome.
In light of this reality, the ABA should promulgate a new Model Rules of
Professional  Conduct  for Lawyers  in  Negotiation  (MRPCN)  that would  be
mandatory  for all practicing  lawyers and that would differ enormously  from
the MRPC  already  in use. The  current  rules  would be  re-named  the  Model
Rules  of Professional  Conduct  for  Litigation  (MRPCL).  As  part  of  this
reform  effort,  the  ABA's  new  Model  Standards  of Conduct  for  Mediators
would be re-named the Model  Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers in
Mediation (MRPCM) and the ABA would promulgate  a set of binding Model
Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers in Arbitration (MRPCA).
By promulgating  mandatory Model  Rules  of Professional  Conduct  that
are  specific to the process  used by the lawyer  in a particular case, the ABA
can best ensure that each  set of ethics-that is,  each set of behavioral  norms
and expectations-is tailored to help lawyers leverage the peculiarities of the
process to achieve the desired or normative outcome of the particular process
being chosen. That is, golfers will be able to play golf with the assurance that
the audience will be quiet and respectful; baseball players will play knowing
that they have  the  loud  and  enthusiastic  support  of their  fans  in the  stands.
Most  importantly,  spectators  will  have  clarity  as  to  what  behaviors  are
appropriate  in each forum.
A  process-specific  approach  to  legal  ethics  obviates  the  legitimate
concerns  of those  who  critique  collaborative  law  and  wonder  whether  the
norms  necessary  for collaborative  lawyering  somehow  violate  the  current
ethical requirements  of the MRPC. 112 A process-specific  approach  to ethics
also eliminates  the  concerns of those  who wonder  about the  practicality  of
111 See supra notes 66-76.
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context-specific  legal  ethics. 13  Instead  of  spawning  literally  dozens  of
specialized sets of legal rules, this approach  simply would create  four sets of
rules,  tailored  to the  specific process  for which  they were  written.  Lawyers
and clients alike would avoid the "conflict  of rules"  concerns  that a context-
specific approach would generate  at the same time that they benefited  from a
rule-set that was tailored to the activity in which the lawyers were engaged.
Additionally,  a  process-enabling  approach  to  ethics  rules  would  truly
help  create  the  kind  of environment  that  would  produce  the  best  possible
lawyering,  generating  and  encouraging  zealous  advocacy  that  was
appropriate to the process being used by the lawyers at the time.
Finally,  the  process-enabling  approach  to  legal  ethics  would  be
administrable  for  lawyers  by  the  bar  itself.  Unlike  a  context-specific
approach  where  several  areas of specialization  may  be  in-play  at  any  one
moment,  the  nature  of mediation,  arbitration,  negotiation,  and  litigation  is
such that all parties can easily know in which process they are engaged and,
therefore,  what  ethical  rules  should  apply. Also,  unlike  the  contract-based
approach that would be enforceable  only through private adjudication by the
parties,  a  highly  unlikely  occurrence,  a mandatory  process-specific  set  of
rules  administered  by  a state bar  association  would  be  enforceable  through
public  sanction  and  would  therefore  provide  the necessary  deterrent  that a
private  contract might  not because  of the  high  cost  of enforcement  by any
one attorney against  another in a specific matter.
As  indicated earlier  in this  piece,  drafters  of the MRPCN  should  craft
ethical  rules that  create  an atmosphere  where  cooperation  and  collaboration
between  lawyers  is  increased.  To  this  end,  the  rules  would  enforce  an
obligation  of candor  and  cooperation  on  all parties.  In order  to  ensure  that
such candor was not exploited, the rules would also need to provide sanctions
for  results  that  were  unfair  or that  failed  to  at  least  adequately  meet  the
interests  of both  sides."14  The  rules  would  also  omit  the  word  "material"
from the  current Model  Rule  4.1 (a) and instead forbid lawyers  from making
any false statement of fact or law to a third person.115
In addition, the rules would require that lawyers have mandatory training
in  negotiation  theory  and  skills  so that  those  who  are  unfamiliar  with  the
concepts  or process of integrative negotiation  can have their understandings
113 See,  e.g.,  Peppet,  supra note  4,  at  513-14  (stating  that  "[tjhe  bar is, and  will
likely  continue  to be,  reluctant  to  promulgate  and try  to  enforce multiple  ethics  codes
simultaneously").
114 Walter  W.  Steele,  Jr.,  Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39
VAND.  L. REv.  1387,  1403  (1986).
115 See Alvin  B.  Rubin,  A  Causerie on Lawyers'  Ethics in Negotiation, 35  LA.  L.
REv. 577, 589 (1975).
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of negotiation  updated  and  their  skills  improved.  While  at first  glance  this
may  seem  like  an  onerous  requirement,  in  fact  mediation  and  arbitration
practitioners are frequently required to participate  in some kind of training as
a  pre-requisite  to  engaging  in  these  processes. 1 6  If  one  agrees  that
negotiation  is also a specialized process for a specialized purpose, it is not at
all inconsistent to require  lawyers to participate in a similar kind of training
in  order  to  maintain  a  state-of-the-art  understanding  of  this  new  and
emerging  field.  In  drafting  the  MRPCN,  the  drafters  might  also  consider
requiring parties to pro-actively  correct others'  material  misunderstanding 117
and  one  might  also  consider rules  that  would require  lawyers  to treat  each
other  with  professional  courtesy  and  respect,  avoiding  difficult  or  hard-
bargaining tactics. 118
Proposing a MRPCN that enabled negotiators to achieve an outcome that
optimized the parties'  interests, was the most value-creating of many options,
was based on fair norms and standards, and that identified commitments that
were  specific  and  operational,  all  while  maintaining  clear  communication
and building  trust, means that the rules would need to provide  sanctions  for
bluffing and puffing  and sanctions  for the intentional use of deceptive  hard-
bargaining  tactics. Enforcement  of these  sanctions  would need  to  be  strict
and names  of those  who violate the rules  would need to be  publicized and
published.
X. ADDRESSING PHILOSOPHICAL/INTELLECTUAL  OBJECTIONS
An important  aspect of my proposal  for a MRPCN  is that, regardless  of
what the specific  rules end up being,  I would make the rules mandatory  for
all lawyers involved in negotiation. The mandatory nature of such a regime is
what  differentiates  it  from  both  the  collaborative  law  approach  and  the
contract model proposed by Peppet. Indeed, I imagine the actual substance of
many of the rules  in my new regime  would mirror the  rules found in many
CLPAs. However, by simply forcing all lawyers to abide by the MRPCN that
I  envision,  I  effectively  remove  the  ethical  questions  raised  by those  who
116 See,  e.g.,  GUIDELINES  FOR  THE  TRAINING  AND  CERTIFICATION  OF  COURT-
REFERRED  MEDIATORS  (Jud.  Council  of  Va.  1999),  available  at
http://www.courts.state.va.us/tom/tom.htm  (last  visited  Oct.  17,  2005);  REQUIREMENTS
FOR  CERTIFICATION  OF  DIVORCE  MEDIATORS  (Mass.  Council  on  Fam.  Mediation),
available  at http://www.mcfin.org/certreq.htm  (last visited Oct. 17,  2005).
117 See Loder, supra note 83,  at 86-88 (noting that nondisclosure  in the face of the
opponent's serious  misunderstanding is an ethical dilemma that should be examined).
118 Professor  Kovach  suggests  the  following  elements  for  a  reenvisioned  ethical
code  for  lawyers:  ethic  of care,  honesty,  good  faith,  competency,  communication,
empathy, altruism, and trust and respect. Kovach, supra  note 34, at 418-29.OHIO STATE JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
assert that the current MRPC  are incompatible  with negotiation  as practiced
by those  who enter into collaborative law agreements.  The  conflict between
competing  behavioral  norms would no longer exist, as lawyers would simply
be subject to the new MRPCN when negotiating, not the MRPCL.
The  decision to make  these rules for negotiation  mandatory, however,  is
likely to raise serious  objections  from a host of academics  and practitioners
alike.  Some will no  doubt object to my willingness  to  impose  the problem-
solving  or  principled  idea  of  a  good  outcome  on  all  legal  negotiators. 119
Under my regime, those who may prefer hard bargaining or beating the other
side would be  forbidden  from the  ethical practice  of law.  In addition, those
who know little about the  ability of skillful negotiators  to actually  do better
for  their  client  through  interest-based  negotiation  than  through  positional
haggling  will  reject  the  definition  of a  good  outcome  I  posited  earlier  and
continue  to believe  that a good  outcome  is  nothing more  than getting  more
for a client than the other side is able to claim for its own.
Finally, there may be  some who have been exposed  to interest-based or
problem-solving  negotiation  but  who,  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  remain
unpersuaded  that  it  produces  better  outcomes  for  clients  than  traditional
approaches  to  negotiation  that  focus  on  distribution  over  value-creation.
Others may agree  that an interest-based  or problem-solving approach can be
helpful  for transactional  lawyers  involved  in  deal-making, but  is less  useful
in  dispute  contexts  or  in  situations  where  the  ongoing  relationship  is
seemingly  unimportant. 120  While  reasonable  people  may  differ,  the
overwhelming  consensus  of  legal  academics,  supported  largely  by  our
brethren  in the hard sciences,  now agree that the state-of-the-art prescription
in negotiation  tends toward  collaboration and a more principled approach  as
the best way to  do  well for your  client  and the best way to deliver on your
client's interests.1 21 Indeed, value can be created even in dispute situations if
the parties have the skill, know-how,  and determination  to do so.122
119 See  Peppet, supra note 4,  at  514-18  (critiquing  the  dominant approach  and  its
reliance upon what he calls the principles of nonaccountability,  partisan professionalism,
and  regulatory  uniformity).  Professor  Peppet  points  out,  as  does  this  article,  that  the
oppressive  homogeneity of the Model Rules has fallen under attack  from many quarters.
See, e.g., supra notes 39-40.
120 See  Michael  L.  Moffitt,  Disputes as  Opportunities to  Create Value,  in  THE
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION,  supra note 3,  at 174 (noting that those involved in a
serious dispute  where trust  is gone are not likely to recognize opportunities  for creating
value with the other side).
121  The  support  for integrative,  problem-solving  bargaining  is  interdisciplinary  in
scope and has an impressive quantitative basis. See supra  notes 66-76; see also Catherine
H. Tinsley, Kathleen M. O'Connor & Brandon A. Sullivan, Tough Guys Finish  Last: The
Perils of a Distributive Reputation, 88  ORGANIZATIONAL  BEHAV.  &  HUM.  DECISION
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With  the  vast  weight  of the  empirical  evidence  in  favor  of a  more
problem-solving  or  collaborative  mindset  as  the  best  way  to  deliver  for
clients, I am left ill-at-ease by a regime that would continue to allow lawyers
to  choose  from  a  menu  of ethics  regimes  for  negotiators,  some  of which
would sanction hard-bargaining  behavior. Let me explain. Imagine  that heart
surgeons develop a new way to perform heart surgery, one that could be done
with  no  incision  and  a  hospital  stay  far  shorter  than  what  is  required  of
traditional  open-heart  surgery.  There  would be  a  time  when  doctors  would
appropriately  want  to  test  the  efficacy  of this  procedure.  At  some  point,
however, it would  become  common  practice  to  perform  surgeries  using the
less  invasive  procedure.  Indeed,  given  the  risks  of traditional  open-heart
surgery,  we would  expect  that  the  American  Medical  Association  (AMA)
would  eventually  require  its  doctors  to  update  themselves  on  these  latest
methods and  compel  surgeons to use the  less invasive  technique.  The AMA
would want to ensure that all its duly accredited  doctors practiced their trade
using  up-to-date  procedures  so  as to produce  the best possible  outcome  for
patients.  Doctors  who  insisted  in  using  the  outdated  and  higher-risk
procedure  would be prohibited  from performing heart surgery  and  lose their
license for failing to provide the appropriate  and prevailing standard of care.
If  my  argument  here  is  correct,  I  wonder  why  the  American  Bar
Association would  not be expected  to ensure  the  same standards  of practice
and care for lawyers.  If we have come to a point where  the vast majority of
those  who  study  negotiation  across  a range  of disciplines  would prescribe
collaboration  and  problem-solving  over haggling  and contention  because  it
produces better results  for clients, why  would the  legal profession  continue
to  allow  lawyers  to  choose  an  outdated,  less  effective  approach  to
negotiation?  Preserving  a  lawyer's  personal  autonomy  or  preferences  is  a
laudable thing as a general matter. However, when the organized bar starts to
preserve  the  personal  autonomy  of  its  members  to  the  detriment  of  the
profession's  clients,  I  believe  that  arguments  of  individual  lawyer
"preference"  or  "autonomy"  have  been  taken  too  far.  To  me,  allowing
lawyers  to  choose  their  ethical  regime  for  negotiation  is  akin  to  letting
doctors prescribe  a remedy that is  known to  be medically  outdated because
PROCESSES 621,  637 (2002). "Although  all negotiations ultimately require value claiming
skills, negotiatiors  should  be wary of developing  a reputation for being a bargainer who
prizes  claiming  value  over  all  other  goals,  as  this  is  likely  to  undercut  profits  when
integrative issues are on the table." Id. (citation omitted).
122 See  Michael  L.  Moffitt,  Disputes as Opportunities to  Create Value,  in  THE
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION,  supra note  3,  at 173-88; see also MNOOKIN  ET AL.,
supra note 59,  at 119 (arguing  that "[r]esolving  legal disputes  is not a purely distributive
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the doctor prefers the remedy  or does not know  how to prescribe  any other
remedy.
In his article defending the smorgasbord  approach to legal ethics, Peppet
argues that "the realities of moral pluralism" prevent the bar from imposing a
set of ethical  rules  that  would  completely  forbid  all  lying  and  that  would
force legal negotiators to collaborate. 123 For this reason, Peppet believes  that
those who have  called for a uniform set of aspirational  ethics forbidding all
deception go too far. If  what drives those who call for such an aspirational set
of ethics is driven by moral superiority,  I could not agree with Peppet more.
While my own view is that the bar ought to encourage  lawyer behavior that
is  ennobling  and  professionally  edifying,  I  think  it  ought  to  respect  the
autonomy  and  individuality  of lawyers  to  make  their own  decisions  as  to
what kind of behavior  is ennobling,  edifying, or morally correct.
However,  my argument  here  does  not rest on  morality.  Instead, it rests
upon an ever-growing  consensus of what constitutes a "good  outcome"  in a
particular  process  called  negotiation.  Since  the  overwhelming  body  of
evidence  suggests  that "best practice"  in negotiation  yields an  outcome that
enlarges the overall  pie, producing better results  for the parties, I am entirely
prepared to hold all members of the profession to the set of ethical  standards
that  will  increase  the  likelihood  that  they  will  achieve  these  outcomes.
Imposing  a  new  ethical  code  that  forces  lawyers  to  share  information,  be
forthright,  and  be  collaborative  does  not  impose  a  "morality"  on  anyone.
However,  it  does  protect  clients  from  lawyers  who  would  behave  using
"older"  or  "outmoded"  technologies  of  negotiation,  those  that  are  now
substandard  and  not  state-of-the-art. 124  Indeed,  if  there  is  one  thing  an
organized  and  self-regulating  professional  organization  should  do,  it  is
monitor and regulate the behavior of its members to ensure that their practice
remains  consistent  with  the  latest  technologies  and  the  most  up-to-date
methods.  In  my  view,  the  persistence  of the  bar  in  allowing  lawyers  to
continue to choose  hard-bargaining  strategies  that simply divide  a  fixed pie
in negotiation not only confounds  issues for those who seek to collaborate  in
negotiation  by  making  it harder  for them  to  distinguish  collaborators  from
"sharks,"  it also puts clients  at risk of receiving substandard  outcomes  from
lawyers who fail to stay updated on state-of-the-art practices.
Another  objection  to making  a  new  set  of  ethical  rules  mandatory  for
lawyers is clients and their own preferences. Indeed,  Peppet argues that if the
bar  imposed  a  new  ethic  of  bargaining  on  lawyers  that  focused  on
123 See Peppet, supra  note 4, at 510.
124 See Tom  Arnold, Advocacy  in Mediation,  13  ALI-ABA  535,  542,  558  (1996)
(lamenting  how  most  lawyers  have  no  real  understanding  of  the  technologies  of
negotiation from preparation to execution).
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collaboration  and cooperation,  a set of clients who come to lawyers precisely
because they are seeking  a tough, gladiatorial  negotiator  would be forced to
look elsewhere  for their agents. 125 My guess  is that many clients  do,  in fact,
come  to lawyers precisely because they are angry with the other party in the
dispute.  If they are not angry and upset, at the very least many clients retain
attorneys  because  they would  like  to  claim  a  larger  share  of the  pie to be
divided for themselves. Consequently, such clients hire the attorney precisely
to  serve  as the  aforementioned  gladiator  and to  use  tools  such  as  bluffing,
puffing, and deception.
A  centrally  important  aspect of effective  lawyering,  however,  involves
counseling  clients  to help them understand  more  fully their interests  and to
work with  the  clients to help  them best  meet those  interests. 126 It  involves
explaining  to  the  client  how  a  problem-solving  mindset  might  be  able  to
enlarge  a  pie  worth  ten  "points"  and,  by  focusing  on  interests  and
brainstorming value-creating opportunities,  transform that pie into one worth
twenty  "points,"  with  distributive  advantages  for  all  parties.  It  is  true,  of
course, that even  the most effective  lawyers will, at times, fail to persuade  a
client that her interests  might be better served by a process that lends itself to
collaboration  instead of contention.  In cases  like this,  however,  litigation  is
likely a better process choice than negotiation.
Even  so, there  will  still be  some  cases  where  a  client insists  on using
negotiation,  not  litigation,  and  also  insists  on  using  deception,  bluffing,
puffing,  and  other  hard-bargainer  tactics.  Because  this  is  what  the  client
prefers  does  not,  of  course,  mean  that  the  lawyer  should  be  permitted  to
oblige.  Again,  a medical  example  is  apropos  here.  Imagine  a  patient  who
comes  to  a  doctor  with  serious  back  pain.  The  doctor  determines  that  the
patient needs surgery to correct a slipped disc. The patient, however,  says she
thinks  that what she  needs is  acupuncture  and vitamin supplements  because
she  insists  these  remedies  will  be  more  effective.  Despite  the  patient's
preferences,  doctors have  an ethical  obligation  to not prescribe remedies  to
patients that they do not believe are an appropriate antidote to the ailment.127
This  is  what  distinguishes  a  profession  from  those  engaged  primarily  in
purely  for-profit  business  activity. 128  And,  despite  the  increasing  business
125 Peppet, supra  note 4, at 510.
126 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 179-80.
127 See generally PRINCIPLES  OF  MEDICAL  ETHICS  (Am.  Med.  Ass'n), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html  (last visited Oct.  17, 2005).
128  For a comprehensive overview and listings of ethical codes, see Ill.  Inst. of Tech.
Ctr.  for  the  Study  of Ethics  in  the  Profs.,  Code of Ethics Introduction, available at
http://ethics.iit.edu/codes/Introduction.html  (last visited Oct.  17, 2005).OHIO STATE JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
realities  that  many  lawyers  face,  lawyers  are  still  professionals,  not
businesspeople.1
29
The  fact  that  the  patient  may  prefer  or  even  demand  that  the  doctor
provide acupuncture and vitamins does not create an obligation on the part of
the doctor  to provide these  remedies.  Does this  result mean that the doctor
may lose  business to another provider, perhaps  one who is not a member of
the medical profession? Of course it does. In light of this sad result, however,
does it mean that the medical profession should allow the doctor to prescribe
a  course  of action  other  than what  is  indicated  or  appropriate  in  order  to
preserve  the  money  flow?  Of course  not.  Indeed,  the  medical  profession
retains  its  credibility  by  insulating  its  decision-making  with  respect  to
diagnosis  from the  whims  and  demands  of patients.  For  lawyers, the  same
should be true. If mandatory ethical rules that require lawyers to collaborate
and be candid in information exchange in negotiation result  in the emergence
of a new set of negotiating agents  who adopt a more  contentious approach  to
negotiation, so be it. There  may even be  a  small percentage  of lawyers who
leave  the  legal  profession  in  order  to  continue  to ply their  trade  as  hard-
nosed, deceptive,  and contentious bargainers.  In the long run,  the purging of
these  sharks  from  the  legal  profession  will  improve  the  reputation  of the
profession  and will  make  it even  easier  for clients  who hire  lawyers  to  get
better outcomes as a result of negotiation.
XI. ADDRESSING PRACTICAL  BARRIERS
Apart  from  these  philosophical  concerns,  there  exist  more  practical
barriers  to  my  proposal  of establishing  four  sets, of ethical  rules  that  are
process-enabling.
A. The Sweeping Scope of the Proposal
Chief  among  these  barriers  is  the  sheer  scope  of  the  project  and  the
enormous  inertia that necessarily  accompanies  a professional  association  of
the  scale  of the  ABA.  Together,  they  make  effectuating  a  reform  of the
magnitude proposed in this article an extremely difficult task, no matter how
attractive the actual proposal may be.
129 See  Chief  Justice  Warren  E.  Burger,  The  Decline  of Professionalism, 63
FORDHAM  L.  REv.  949  (1995)  (stating  that  the  law  is  not  and  never  has  been  a
"business");  but see,  Russell  G.  Pearce,  The  Professionalism Paradigm Shift:  Why
Discarding  Professional  Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar,
70 N.Y.U.  L.  REv.  1229,  1264 (1995)  (making the  case  in  favor of a  shift away  from
professionalism  and toward a business model of lawyering).
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Having  said  this,  throughout  its  history  the  bar  has  endeavored  to  re-
examine its ethics code to ensure that  it was meeting the current needs of the
profession. 13 0  Most recently, the Ethics 2000 Commission was charged to do
this. Even at the time the Ethics 2000 Commission met, there were some who
suggested  that  the  bar  should  undertake  a  re-examination  of  the  basic
structure  of the  Model  Rules  since  they  are  based  on  the  fallacy  of the
monolithic  attorney-client  relationship. 131  In the  end,  this  did  not happen,
however.132  Indeed,  the  failure  of Ethics  2000  to  address  adequately  the
needs  of  those  in  the  profession  who  now  engage  in  process  pluralism
encouraged  the  continued  use  and  development  of various  private  ethical
codes  for  mediators  and  arbitrators  as  well  as  the  further  growth  of the
collaborative  law  movement. 133 While  there will  inevitably be resistance  to
sweeping  changes  in  the  Model  Rules,  especially  to  changes  that  would
essentially create four  entirely different  sets of ethical rules, my own view is
that  the  difficulty  of the  task  should  not  dissuade  those  who  care  about
producing  good  outcomes  and  encouraging  behavior  that  will  foster  such
outcomes from working assiduously for reform in the profession.
To this  end,  we need to make  the case  more  strongly that each  dispute
resolution  process  really does have  a different purpose,  a different idea of a
good outcome,  and  a different  set of behavioral  norms or ethical guidelines.
Part  of this involves  law  faculty  continuing  to work with  our colleagues  in
other disciplines  in the academy to produce  empirical  research  to share  with
those  in  the  legal  profession.  Just  as importantly,  however,  those  who  are
130 See Krane, supra note 83, at 328-29.
131 Menkel-Meadow,  supra note  22,  at  84;  see also Carrie  Menkel-Meadow,  The
Limits  of  Adversarial  Ethics,  in  ETHICS  IN  PRACTICE:  LAWYERS'  ROLES,
RESPONSIBILITIES,  AND REGULATION  123 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000)  (discussing some
of the differences  in the ethical questions  faced by lawyers in  non-adversarial roles  from
the assumptions and ethics of those in a more traditional adversarial stance).
132 Menkel-Meadow,  supra note  22,  at  85  (lamenting  that  the  ABA  Ethics  2000
Commission adopted only a de minimis approach to deal with ethics issues in the practice
of dispute resolution despite  intense lobbying activity by mediators, arbitrators,  and other
third-party neutrals).
133 See, e.g., Isaacs, supra  note 4, at 842. Isaacs states:
The  findamental  hitch  in  the  resolution  of  ethical  issues  surrounding
Collaborative Law is prevalent throughout the recent expansion  of ADR approaches:
without  recognized  authorities  who  possess  the  power to  resolve  the many  ethical
questions  emerging from  multi-disciplinary  approaches,  the practice  lacks  guidance
and credibility. Barring the recent development of any such authority, the next best
solution must come  from  the proactive  efforts of self-governance  by  Collaborative
Law practitioners.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).OHIO STATE JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
advocates  of ADR  and  who  understand  it deeply  must  do  a  better job  of
publicizing stories of value-creating  outcomes when lawyers  collaborate with
each  other.134  The  combination  of empirical  research  and powerful  stories
together work synergistically to persuade integrative negotiation  skeptics that
negotiation  is  a  dispute  resolution  process  that,  properly  practiced,  can
enlarge the pie and capture joint gains.
B. Triggering  Ethical  Rules
Earlier, I posited that one of the reasons that might explain why there are
not  "Model  Rules"  of engagement  for negotiation  in the way that  there are
for mediation,  arbitration,  and  litigation  might  relate  to  the  fact  that  many
may  still  not view  negotiation  as  a process  unto  itself but rather  as  a  step
along  the way  to  litigation.  In  this piece,  I have argued  that negotiation  is
indeed  entirely  different  from  litigation-both  in  terms  of  its  overall
definition of a good outcome but also in terms of the kinds of behaviors that
would be recommended  or  conducive in  one  activity  over the other. At the
same time, parties  involved  in  litigation  will negotiate  at times.  Sometimes
they will  attempt  to settle  after a complaint  has  been filed, sometimes  after
some discovery  has been completed,  or often, right on the  courthouse  steps
right  before  trial. This kind  of bargaining  is a  component  part of litigation
and is not a process entirely separate from litigation.
Under  my proposal that lawyers  be subject to  an entirely different set of
ethical  rules  depending  on  the  process  in  which  they  are  engaged,  one
challenge  would  be to  know  when  negotiation  ends  and  litigation  begins.
Because  mediation  and arbitration have  been accepted  as separate  processes
from their  inception,  lawyers  involved  in either  of these  two  activities  can
easily distinguish  in which process  they are engaging  and what rules  should
apply. In order for my scheme to work, lawyers must have clarity as to which
process  they  are  engaged  and  therefore  which  rules  apply  as  between
negotiation and litigation as well. This is particularly  important given that the
ethical  rules  I  would propose  for negotiation vary  enormously  from those  I
would  propose  for  litigation  in  terms  of the  required  levels  of disclosure,
truth-telling, and openness.
Any  number  of  mechanisms  might  be  used  to  trigger  an  end  to
negotiation and a beginning of litigation. For example:
Lawyers might be presumed to be following negotiation rules in  all
interactions until they officially file a complaint.
134 See Bordone  et al.,  supra note  18,  at 512 (arguing  that popular perceptions  of a
field  are  formed  more  by  compelling  stories  and  vivid  images  than  by  empirical
evidence).
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*  Lawyers  might  be  presumed  to  be  following  negotiation  process
rules  even  after  they  file  a  complaint.  The  rules  would  shift  to
litigation  rules  once  either  side  filed  a  formal  document  with  the
court, perhaps called  a "Notice  of Process Change."
*  Another  approach  would  be the establishment  of settlement  counsel
as separate  and  distinct  from  litigation  counsel,  a proposal  already
heralded  by  others. 135  Under  this  scheme,  a  party  would  hire  an
attorney  for  the  negotiation  process  and,  if  this  did  not  yield  a
settlement,  the  client  would  then  bring  in  another  attorney  for
litigation. The second attorney need not be from an entirely  different
firm  as  the  first,  but  would  need  to  be  an  entirely  different
individual.  This scheme has  the  advantage of creating  a clear  break
and  also opens the way for negotiation  as a specialty  process  in the
same  way that mediation  and  arbitration have come  to be thought of
as  specialties.  A  potential  downside  of  this  triggering  process,
however,  is  that  it  may  make  some  clients  who  know  little  about
negotiation  ex ante simply opt  for  a  litigation  counsel  at  the  very
beginning  of  their  engagement  or  dispute  in  order  to  save  the
additional  cost of ultimately  needing  to  hire  a litigation  attorney  if
negotiation  does not work out.
I  should  note  that the  problem of determining what process the  parties
are  engaged  in,  while  important,  only  matters  for  lawyers  engaged  in
disputes.  For those  whose  practice  is  transactional,  the  assumption  that the
parties  are engaged  in  negotiation  is  clearer.  Moreover,  whether  any of the
solutions  above  are  acceptable  matters  less  than  establishing  the  fact that,
with creativity and the will, it is possible to craft a relatively simple and low-
cost way of separating the process of negotiation  from litigation and from the
back-and-forth  kind of bargaining that sometimes accompanies  litigation.
C. Enforcement Issues
Enforcement  of professional  codes  of ethics  is  and  always  has been  a
major  challenge. 136  Enforcing  the  current  MRPC,  though  already  quite
135  See William F. Coyne, Jr.,  The  Case for Settlement  Counsel, 14  OHIO ST.  J. ON
Disp.  RESOL.  367  (1999)  (describing  and  making  the  case  for  the  use  of  settlement
counsel  that  is  separate  from  litigation  counsel);  see  also  James  E.  McGuire,  Why
Litigators Should Use Settlement  Counsel, 18  ALTERNATIVES  TO  HIGH COST LITIG.  107,
121  (2000) (explaining how the use  of settlement counsel  can  save time  and  money  for
clients).
136 See  White,  supra  note  65,  at  91  (suggesting  some  of  the  reasons  why
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difficult to  do well,  is made  somewhat easier by the fact that the rules  set a
behavioral  floor  or  minimum  standard  rather  than  an  aspiration.  However,
the MRPCN would require  an extremely high degree of candidness,  honesty,
and  information  sharing.  Because  the  standard will be  so  high,  monitoring
and enforcement  will be both more difficult and, especially in the beginning,
more important in order to create a sufficient deterrent effect.
Despite the challenge,  however, enforcement  is possible. We see largely
effective  enforcement  of mandatory "truth telling"  in a number of regulatory
regimes  from  the  obligations  of prosecutors  to  make  all evidence  available
against  an  accused  available  to  the  attorney  of the  accused 137  to  various
required  financial  submissions  public  companies  must  make  on  a  regular
basis to the  Securities and Exchange  Commission  (SEC). 138 While there are
clearly those who would endeavor  to evade these requirements,  the levels of
compliance  are  extremely  high and  the  ability of enforcement  agencies  to
detect and discipline those who would evade such requirements is impressive
and effective.
Even  in  areas  where  there  may  have  been  rampant  cheating  or  "bad
behavior,"  it  is  possible  to  change  norms  and  create  an  ethic  of order.  A
prominent and recent example of this includes the downloading of free music
from  the  Internet  using  cites  such  as  Napster.  Just  three  years  ago,
downloading  pirated  music  for  free  from  such  sites  was  commonplace. 139
Today, thanks  to high-profile  enforcement  efforts,  this  behavior  is  rapidly
being curbed as  it is replaced with the legal downloading of music from cites
such  as  iTunes  and  RealPlayer. 140  Effective,  high  profile  enforcement
of negotiation,  the  ease  of evading  detection,  and  the  ubiquity  of negotiation  as  a
process).
137 See MODEL RULES OF PROF.  CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004) (requiring prosecutors to
make  timely  disclosure  to  the  defense  of  all  evidence  or  information  known  to  the
prosecutor that tends  to negate  the  guilt of the accused  in any way); see, e.g., Casey  P.
McFaden,  Prosecutorial  Misconduct, 14  GEO.  J. LEGAL  ETHICS  1211,  1224-28  (2001)
(Providing  a  detailed  explanation  of judicial  enforcement  of the  prosecutor's  duty  to
reveal exculpatory evidence  to the defense).
138 See, e.g.,  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.  107-204,  § 401  116 Stat. 745
(2002) (requiring disclosures of off-balance sheet transactions).
139 See,  e.g.,  Online Music Distribution: A  New Era, in  IPSOS  WORLD  MONITOR,
Second  Quarter  2003,  at  24,  available  at  http://www.ipsos-
insight.com/pdf/wm.03.12.02.pdf (last visited Oct.  17,  2005)  (reporting  on data  frum the
end of 2002 that, "[m]ost Americans  participating in online music  acquisition  are getting
their downloads for free").
140 See  Mary Madden  &  Lee  Rainie,  Pew Intemet  & American  Life  Project Data
Memo, Re:  Music and Video Downloading  Moves Beyond  P2P (Mar. 2005), available  at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPFilesharingMarch05.pdf  (last  visited  Oct.  17,
2005)  (reporting  results  from  a  March  2005  survey  that  found  that  43%  of music
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combined  with a fair, easy-to-understand  system for the  legal distribution  of
music  over the Internet transformed  a  culture in just three years. The upshot
here  is simple:  a defeatist  attitude  will ensure defeat. But  a concerted  effort
on the part of the bar to  enforce a new  set of ethical  rules can  work if those
charged with the job of enforcement are committed to the task and given the
resources to make it work.
There  is  no reason  to think  that the  vast  majority of lawyers  forced  to
follow a new ethical  code for negotiation would not comply. Moreover, one
would expect that the ABA would  devise an enforcement  regime that would
deter many from violating the rules and punish those who failed to be candid,
respectful, and forthright in information exchange.
D. Lawyer's Skill Set
As  lawyers  have  begun  to  engage  in  mediation,  arbitration,  problem-
solving negotiation, and other ADR processes,  some have asked the question
of whether their skill sets, orientations,  and personality  are well-suited  to the
demands  of these  processes,  all  of which emphasize  the value  of creativity,
listening,  and collaboration  over  persuasive  argument,  analytical  reasoning,
and  traditional  advocacy  practice. 41  When  it  comes  to  personality  and
capacity  for  these  processes,  there  is  little  empirical  data  to  know  how
lawyers  measure  up  against  other  professionals  with  these  skills.
142
Moreover, it is hard to separate fact from fiction. We do know,  however, that
cultural  expectations  and  stereotypes  powerfully  inform  and  influence  how
individuals behave. 143 We also know that the institutional scripts for lawyers
focus  on  adversarialism  in  ways  that  make  a  problem-solving  or
downloaders  had  bought  music  from  iTunes  or  BuyMusic.com,  up  from just 24%  in
2004).
141  See  Menkel-Meadow,  supra note  4;  Jonathan  M.  Hyman,  Trial Advocacy  and
Methods of Negotiation:  Can Good Trial  Advocates Be  Wise Negotiators?,  34  UCLA L.
REv.  863  (1987).
142 But see Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers
Change? A  Critique of Solutions to  Problems with  Professionalism by  Reference  to
Empirically-Derived  Attorney Personality  Attributes, 11  GEO.  J. LEGAL ETHics 547,  581
(1998)  (suggesting  that research  on  the  psychological  profile of law  students  indicates
that they are more competitive,  less able to empathize,  and more dominant and unwilling
to compromise).
143 See  MNOOKIN  ET  AL.,  supra note  59,  at  167-71  (discussing  tacit  cultural
assumptions  about the lawyering  that result in attorneys  and clients adopting a zero-sum,
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collaborative  approach  to negotiation even  more difficult, regardless  of what
skills or orientations lawyers may have. 144
Putting aside mere cultural or institutional norms, it may well be true that
those who are  drawn  to law may be  better  at rhetoric and  argument  than at
creativity  or  listening.  The  vast  majority of lawyers,  however,  do  have the
capacity  to participate  in various  non-adversarial  processes with  competence
and with a high degree of skill.  What they lack is appropriate training. 145 For
many, three years of learning  "how  to be  a lawyer" in law  school, followed
in some cases by many years of adversarial  litigation practice, simply means
that the skills of listening, collaboration,  and creativity are  not so much non-
existent as they are under-utilized and, therefore, under-developed.  However,
just like  a proper  weight-training  program can build back muscles  that had
long been  in disuse, the  same  is  true of a proper negotiation  skills training
program. Moreover,  under a scheme where the MRPCN  fundamentally alter
the way many lawyers help parties resolve  disputes, one  would imagine that
over time  those who  are  drawn to the  practice of law will embrace a wider
range  of personality  types,  including  both  those  who  enjoy  advocacy  and
persuasion as well as those who enjoy collaboration  and creativity.
XII.  CONCLUSION
As the modem  ADR  movement  begins  its fourth  decade,  the  idea  that
lawyers  should  be  trained  to  diagnosis  the  symptoms  of a  dispute  before
prescribing  an  appropriate  dispute  resolution  process  that  fits  the  parties
needs is one that is taking hold in many quarters. There will soon be an entire
generation of lawyers who have some exposure  to a broader range of dispute
resolution processes beside litigation. More and more, lawyers are learning to
fit  the  dispute  resolution  forum  to  the  fuss.  At  the  same  time,  lawyers
engaged  in these processes have  struggled with how to reconcile the ethical
rules of the profession with the exigencies of the new processes.
This paper  calls  for  a radical  reform to the  ethical regime  of the legal
profession.  Arguing  that  ethical  rules  exist  primarily  to  create  behavioral
norms  conducive  to the  successful  outcome  of a  given  process,  the  paper
posits  that  a  different  set  of  ethical  rules  should  exist  for  each  dispute
resolution  process.  Focusing  specifically  on  the  oft-overlooked  process  of
negotiation,  the paper makes the case for a set of rules that would encourage
greater  disclosure  between  the  parties,  more  candid  communication,
improved  trust, and  increased focus  on creativity  so  as  to  create  conditions
that enable parties to achieve a successful outcome in negotiation.
144 See MNOOKIN  ET AL., supra  note 59,  at 156.
145 See Arnold, supra note 124, at 557.
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Because  the  effort  to  persuade  traditional  law  faculties  to  include
negotiation  as  a  separate  discipline  in  the  law  school  curriculum  has
consumed  so much energy,  ADR scholars have not paid  enough attention to
reconciling  the  mismatch  between  what  we  teach  our  students  is  ideal
negotiation  behavior  and the  kind of actual  behavior  they  find  in  practice.
One  way of dealing  with this would  be  to teach  behaviors  that  accept the
reality  of a  norm  of hard,  distributional  bargaining  where  those  who  hold
their  cards  close  to their  vest claim  more  value.  Another is  to  continue  to
teach negotiation  in a problem-solving mode, as most do now, and encourage
an  ever-increasing  grassroots  movement  of  lawyers  to  contract  privately
using  collaborative  law  or  other  market-based  approaches.  Given  what  we
have  learned  empirically  about  the enormous  and  largely  unrealized  power
negotiation  offers  attorneys  to  produce  better,  more  valuable  outcomes  for
their clients by adopting a problem-solving  mindset, neither of these options
seems fitting.
Instead, the bar owes it to clients and the public  at-large to ensure that its
members  are  using  state-of-the-art  techniques  and  approaches  in  their
practice.  With  respect to  state-of-the-art  best practices  for  negotiation,  it is
clear  that  encouraging  lawyers  to  share  information  collaboratively,  listen,
and  seek  integrative  outcomes  is  the  best  way  to  capture  joint  gains.
Therefore,  the profession  should create and adopt ethical rules for negotiators
that require this behavior.
For  those  persuaded  by  the  merits  of  interest-based  negotiation  as  a
powerful  lawyering  tool,  the  project  of transforming  the  profession  is  a
daunting one.  Where  many would  use a  market  approach,  exploiting  either
reputational  markets  or the power of contract, given the scope of the task, a
process-enabling  approach to  legal  ethics  dictated by the ABA itself seems
not only the most  likely means of accomplishing  the goal, but perhaps  also
the  most  responsible  given  the  bar's  duty  as  a  professional  accrediting
association  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  profession's  clients.  Fitting  the
ethical  code  and behavioral  norms  of lawyers  to  the forum  being  used  by
those  lawyers  will be  one of the most  important  and valuable  contributions
that the second generation of ADR scholars,  working with legal ethicists, can
make to the successful practice of law.OHIO STATE JOURNAL  ON DISPUTE  RESOLUTION [Vol.  21:120051